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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s 1997 decision in United States v. Watts,
which held that sentencing judges may consider conduct of which
a defendant has previously been acquitted,1 evidenced a curious
set of dissonances. On the one hand, the Court represented its
holding as a foregone conclusion, foreshadowed by the unified
agreement of “[e]very other Court of Appeals [excepting the
Ninth],” and dictated by the “clear implications of
18 U.S.C. § 3661, the Sentencing Guidelines, and this Court’s
decisions.”2 Indeed, so sure was the Court of Watts’s outcome
that it decided the case without full briefing or oral argument.3
On the other hand, when Watts was decided, the legitimacy of
considering prior acquitted conduct in sentencing was hardly a
venerable or entrenched institution. Indeed, Watts placed the
Court’s imprimatur on a sentencing practice that courts had
approved only with carefully nuanced restraints merely twentyfive years before.4
Likewise, on the one hand, the Watts opinion was released to
“virtually no attention.”5 On the other hand, the practice
legitimated by the decision was controversial.
Before the
1

United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 149 (1997) (per curiam).
Id.
3
See id. at 171 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
4
See, e.g., United States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1972).
5
Elizabeth E. Joh, Comment, “If It Suffices To Accuse”: United States v. Watts
and the Reassessment of Acquittals, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887, 913 (1998).
2
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decision came down, the U.S. Sentencing Commission had listed
“developing options to limit the use of acquitted conduct at
sentencing” as one of its “[p]riority issues for the 1996–97
amendment cycle.”6 Moreover, the defense bar later reported “a
growing chorus of outrage by judges across the nation at a
sentencing system that treats alike conviction or acquittal,
calling it ‘bizarre,’ ‘dangerous,’ and a ‘blatant injustice.’ ”7 The
scholarly consensus, too, was universally skeptical of the
practice’s prudence. While Watts would receive little analysis,
and most of that in the course of scholarly works on related
topics,8 all the analysis it did receive was negative.9
How did the Court come to nonchalantly ratify a relatively
novel sentencing practice universally regarded by onlookers with
opprobrium?10 The mystery extends beyond the four corners of
6
Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,465 (July 2,
1996).
7
Amy Baron-Evans, Supreme Court OKs Acquitted Conduct, Sentencing
Commission Invites Comment on Alternatives, CHAMPION, Mar. 1997, at 62, 62.
8
See, e.g., Marguerite A. Driessen, Challenging the Irrelevant Acquittal, 11 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 331, 333 (2002) (using Watts as a case-study, proving the new
irrelevance of acquittals in the criminal justice system); Peter Erlinder, “Doing
Time” . . . After the Jury Acquits: Resolving the Post-Booker “Acquitted Conduct”
Sentencing Dilemma, 18 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 79, 100 (2008) (arguing that
Watts draws the line between admissible and inadmissible relevant conduct in the
wrong place); Judge Nancy Gertner, Circumventing Juries, Undermining Justice:
Lessons from Criminal Trials and Sentencing, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 419, 422 (1999)
(criticizing Watts as a jury-undermining aspect of the Sentencing Guidelines); Amy
D. Ronner, Punishment Meted Out for Acquittals: An Antitherapeutic Jurisprudence
Atrocity, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 459 (1999).
9
As an under-studied Supreme Court case, Watts spawned a small cottage
industry of student notes. These, too, were uniformly negative on the merits of
sentencing a defendant on the basis of charges for which he had previously been
acquitted. For a representative sample, see, for example, Joh, supra note 5, at 890
(criticizing Watts for failing to take into account the proper expressive meaning of
acquittals); Jeff Nicodemus, Note, Watts v. United States: The Misguided Approval
of a Sentencing Court’s Authority To Consider Acquitted Conduct During Sentencing,
25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 437, 470 (1998) (arguing that treating an acquittal like a
conviction is “unconscionable”); Marvin Sprouse, Note, A Sentence for Acquittal: The
Supreme Court Holds That Sentences May Be Enhanced for “Conduct” for Which
Persons Have Been Tried and Acquitted: United States v. Watts, 117 S. Ct. 633
(1997), 28 TEX. TECH L. REV. 963, 997 (1997) (characterizing Watts as “legal
sophistry”); Sandra K. Wolkov, Note, Reasonable Doubt in Doubt: Sentencing and the
Supreme Court in United States v. Watts, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 661, 680 (1998)
(arguing that Watts fosters a “presumption of guilt”).
10
Unlike those cases in which the approval of an unpopular practice is traced by
some to ideology, Watts was a per curiam 7-2 decision, with one member of each
ideological “wing” of the court penning a dissent. See Watts v. United States, 519
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the Watts decision to the virtual unanimity of the courts of
appeals—relied upon by the Watts Court—in favor of the use of
prior acquitted conduct at sentencing.11 To what do we attribute
this confluence of the circuits in favor of a practice characterized
both by its novelty and, according to the scholarly consensus, its
imprudence?
This Article attempts to answer those questions both
historically and theoretically. On a historical level, it traces the
heretofore unexamined course of the congressional, judicial, and
administrative actions leading from a pre-1970s sentencing
regime that viewed any use of extra-trial evidence in sentencing
as constitutionally suspect to the 1997 case that embraced prior
acquittal sentencing as a foregone conclusion. On a more
theoretical level, the Article traces the justification for prior
acquittal sentencing to two doctrinal tensions: the differing goals
of trials and sentencing and the semiotic gap between acquittal
and innocence. As outside forces exerted pressure on those two
tensions, the case for prior acquittal sentencing grew more
compelling. In response, Congress twice chose to modify the
statutory regime governing prior acquittal sentencing, codifying
it in more categorical terms. Each codification encouraged judges
to mechanize their use of prior acquitted conduct at sentencing,
at times leading to instances of prior acquittal sentencing
blatantly at odds with the regime’s underlying logic. The
Sentencing Guidelines continued that mechanization, effectively
rendering the use of prior acquitted conduct at sentencing
automatic.
In the wake of Booker and Watts, however, judges have a
new opportunity to reassert discretion in the area of prior
acquittal sentencing.
This Article concludes by exhorting

U.S. 148 (1997) (per curiam); id. at 159 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 170
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
11
Id. at 149 n.1 (majority opinion) (citing United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624,
635–36 (D.C. Cir. 1992)); United States v. Milton, 27 F.3d 203, 208–09 (6th Cir.
1994); United States v. Coleman, 947 F.2d 1424, 1428–29 (10th Cir. 1991); United
Sates v. Averi, 992 F.2d 765, 765–66 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. RodriguezGonzalez, 899 F.2d 177, 180–82 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Fonner, 920 F.2d
1330, 1332–33 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Dawn, 897 F.2d 1444, 1449–50 (8th
Cir. 1990); United States v. Mocciola, 891 F.2d 13, 16–17 (1st Cir. 1989); United
States v. Ryan, 866 F.2d 604, 608–09 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Isom, 886 F.2d
736, 738–39 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Juarez-Ortega, 866 F.2d 747, 748–49
(5th Cir. 1989).

CP_McCusker (Do Not Delete)4/4/2011 2:13 PM

2010]

HARD CASES MAKE GOOD LAW

1419

sentencing judges to do so actively by: (1) scrutinizing evidence of
prior acquitted conduct for indicia of reliability and (2) balancing
the good of accuracy in sentencing with the compelling public
policy reasons weighing against any introduction of prior
acquitted conduct at sentencing.
In so arguing, the Article proceeds as follows: Part I begins
the history of prior acquittal sentencing at the Watts decision’s
clearest progenitor, Williams v. New York,12 the first American
case to hold that extra-trial evidence may be used at sentencing.
The Williams decision is notable in two respects. First, Williams
reveals the underlying logic justifying prior acquittal sentencing:
because sentencing’s aims require broad truth-seeking, prior
acquittal sentencing is defensible in the narrow set of cases
where a prior acquittal indicates not innocence but merely a
failure by the prosecution to meet an exacting burden of proof.
Second, Williams provides one potential model on which a prior
acquittal sentencing regime could be patterned.
That is,
Williams held that extra-trial evidence is not per se excluded at
sentencing, but did not extend blanket approval to all uses of
prior acquitted conduct at sentencing. The minimalism of that
holding had the dual effect of: (1) emphasizing the existence of
judicial discretion not to consider prior acquitted conduct at
sentencing and (2) leaving later sentencing courts open to asapplied challenges of their use of prior acquitted conduct in
sentencing. In so doing, it indirectly forced courts to consider the
logical justifications for prior acquittal sentencing and
encouraged them to scrutinize external indicia of reliability.
Part II examines the first of the changes that altered the
Williams baseline: the passage of 18 U.S.C. § 3577, the 1970
statute affirming the use of prior acquitted conduct in
sentencing, on which the Watts Court based much of its decision.
Through a detailed analysis of the heretofore unexamined
legislative and enaction history of § 3577, Part II identifies the
passage of § 3577 as a congressional backlash against the use of
the rules of evidence for purposes other than ensuring the
reliability of evidence presented in court. This backlash was
stimulated, the legislative history will show, both by the
corruption of the legal system by organized crime and by the new
evidentiary rules formulated by the Warren Court during its
12

337 U.S. 241 (1949).
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“criminal procedure revolution”—particularly the Exclusionary
Rule incorporated against the states by Mapp v. Ohio.13 Both
stimuli served to enlarge the class of cases in which acquittal
indicated something other than innocence. Congress’s response
was 18 U.S.C. § 3577, a statute that codified Williams’s result
without the benefit of its reasoning. Section 3577 differed
markedly from Williams in: (1) emphasizing the absence of limits
on the admission of prior acquitted conduct at sentencing and
(2) providing a safe harbor to lower courts against reversal for
improper prior acquittal sentencing.
Part III contrasts the differing effects of Williams and of
§ 3577 on the decisions of lower courts by examining a naturally
occurring controlled experiment. In the wake of § 3577’s passage,
several courts of appeals reviewed decisions that had relied on
prior acquitted conduct as a sentencing factor. While some of
those cases viewed the issue as governed by § 3577, others
deemed Williams to be the controlling authority. Comparison of
the two lines of cases is revealing: Those cases governed by
§ 3577 betray a mechanized application of a text whose import
and underlying justifications they fail to grasp, while those cases
following Williams demonstrate a thoughtful consideration of the
logic underlying prior acquittal sentencing, combined with an
attentive scrutiny of the underlying factual evidence for indicia of
reliability.
Part IV examines the next major development in prior
acquittal sentencing: the promulgation of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines (“the Guidelines”). By incorporating § 3557 and
instructing judges to consider all relevant conduct, the
Guidelines effectively transformed § 3557 from a statute
permitting prior acquittal sentencing to one mandating prior
acquittal sentencing. The effect was immediate. In the wake of
the Guidelines’ promulgation, a sharp uptick in the number of
prior acquittal sentencings rendered under § 3557 occurred.
These cases partook of the mechanization widely identified as
inherent to Guidelines-based sentencing. Post-Guidelines prior
acquittal sentencing exhibited a strong tendency to decide cases
through statutory interpretation of § 3557, rather than by
considering the goals of sentencing and the underlying
justifications of prior acquittal sentencing.
13

367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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Part V turns to the Watts decision with which this Article
opened. By Part V, the decision will seem a foregone conclusion,
dictated by the triple-threat of Williams, § 3577, and the
Guidelines. The formulation of the Watts holding is significant in
two respects, however. First, its framing is more akin to
Williams’s holding than it is to § 3577. By its negative phrasing
as the denial of any per se prohibition on the use of prior
acquitted conduct at sentencing, Watts both leaves room for asapplied challenges to particular uses of prior acquitted conduct
and encourages sentencing judges to exercise discretion when
deciding whether or not to engage in prior acquittal sentencing.
Second, Watts’s holding specifically incorporates a standard for
evidentiary reliability into its test for the admissibility of prior
acquitted conduct at sentencing.
Part VI addresses the future of prior acquittal sentencing
after Booker. In a post-Guidelines regime, judges have great
discretion as a matter of law with respect to prior acquittal
sentencing. Part VI argues that they should reassert that
discretion, at the very least scrutinizing prior acquitted conduct
for indicia of reliability prior to admission. Moreover, it argues
that certain policy considerations weigh against the use of prior
acquitted conduct as a sentencing factor even in the narrow class
of cases where that use is justified by the logic of sentencing.
Even in that class of cases, Part VI posits, judges should weigh
those policy consideration against the good of accuracy in
sentencing when exercising their discretion.
I.

WILLIAMS V. NEW YORK: EXTRA-TRIAL EVIDENCE AT
SENTENCING

The use of prior unconvicted conduct as a sentencing factor
first came before the Supreme Court in the 1949 case, Williams
v. New York. In that case, the Court held that the Due Process
Clause did not prohibit a sentencing judge from relying on a
presentence report containing information about the defendant’s
prior uncharged crimes that would not have been admissible at
trial.14
As the federal government’s first foray into the issue of using
extra-trial evidence at sentencing, Williams serves as the point of
departure for analysis of prior acquittal sentencing. Williams’s
14

Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250–51 (1949).
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approach to the logically prior question of uncharged conduct in
sentencing is consistent with the later Watts Court’s reasoning
with respect to prior acquittal sentencing. Nonetheless, the two
decisions also demonstrate important differences. One of this
Articles’s central tasks is to trace and explain prior acquittal
sentencing’s journey from Williams to Watts, before evaluating
that transformation normatively and suggesting a course of
action for the future.
A.

Background and Holding

Nearly half a century before the Watts decision, Samuel Titto
Williams was convicted of first-degree murder for a killing that
occurred during a robbery. The jury, which was not presented,
per the Rules of Evidence,15 with evidence of Williams’s alleged
prior misdeeds, recommended life imprisonment.16 Five weeks
later, after a statutory pre-sentence investigation report had
been filed with the judge, a sentencing hearing was held. The
presentence report included “accusations, based on hearsay
unsworn statements of various persons with whom appellant was
not confronted and as to whom he was afforded no opportunity
for cross examination or rebuttal, that appellant had been guilty
of other crimes.”17 These allegations reflected alleged conduct
with which Williams had never been charged; as such, they were
untried in any court of law.
The defendant protested his innocence, but the sentencing
judge imposed the death penalty on him.18 In a departure from
typical practice, the sentencing judge chronicled his reasons for
the upward departure from the jury’s sentence in great detail.
From the presentence report, the judge had apparently “learned”
that the defendant had committed nearly thirty earlier
burglaries, none of which had resulted in convictions, but to
many of which he had confessed or been identified as the
perpetrator.19
The report also contained certain first-hand
accounts, including one by a seven year-old girl alleging that she

15
FED. R. EVID. 404 (excluding character evidence of other crimes, wrongs, acts,
or habits unless subject to various exceptions).
16
Williams, 337 U.S. at 242.
17
Brief for Appellant-Defendant at 4, Williams, 337 U.S. 241 (No. 671).
18
Williams, 337 U.S. at 244.
19
Id.
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was sexually assaulted by the defendant,20 leading the sentencing
judge to conclude that Williams “possessed a ‘morbid sexuality’ ”
and to “classif[y] him as a ‘menace to society.’ ”21
B.

Underlying Rationales: Trial and Sentencing Distinguished

An examination of the Williams decision reveals that it
rests—at times implicitly—on two related rationales: (1) the
differing epistemological goals of trials and sentencing and
(2) the relationship between the goals of trials and the
evidentiary restrictions imposed thereon. It is argued below that
these two rationales plausibly lay the groundwork to justify prior
acquittal sentencing—but only in the narrow set of cases where
defendants’ acquittals result from the evidentiary restraints
imposed on trials rather than their actual innocence. Before
addressing prior acquittal sentencing, however, these two
rationales and their interrelation must be considered.
The evidentiary gap between trial and sentencing occurs
precisely because the goals of trials differ from those of
sentencing hearings. That is, trials aim not to convict the guilty
and acquit the innocent, but rather only to achieve the more
modest goal of convicting those defendants whose guilt with
respect to a given crime has been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt: “Rules of evidence have been fashioned for criminal trials
which narrowly confine the trial contest to evidence that is
strictly relevant to the particular offense charged.”22 Sentencing,
on the other hand, has the more ambitious aim of
“individualizing punishment[ ]”23 to the individual character of a
given offender.
To encompass sentencing’s broad goals, a
sentencing judge must, above all, strive to see a defendant as he
really is24: “Highly relevant—if not essential—to [the sentencing

20

Brief for Appellant-Defendant at 8–9, Williams, 337 U.S. 241 (No. 671).
Williams, 337 U.S. at 244.
22
Id. at 246–47; see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 372 (1970) (“It is
critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof
that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. . . . [W]e do
not view the social disutility of convicting an innocent man as equivalent to the
disutility of acquitting someone who is guilty.”).
23
Williams, 337 U.S. at 249.
24
This goal of “seeing the defendant as he really is” is embodied in the
Guidelines’ adoption of elements of “real-offense sentencing” as opposed to “chargeoffense sentencing.” For a critical overview, see David Yellen, Illusion, Illogic, and
21
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judge’s] selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of
the fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life
and characteristics.”25 This aim of seeing the defendant as he
truly is is best served, in the Court’s view, by allowing as much
information as possible to be available to the sentencing judge:
“[M]odern concepts individualizing punishment have made it all
the more necessary that a sentencing judge not be denied an
opportunity to obtain pertinent information by a requirement of
rigid adherence to restrictive rules of evidence properly
applicable to the trial.”26
Here, then, is the purest account of the Court’s decision to
allow extra-trial evidence at sentencing: To determine whether
or not a presumptively innocent man should face the stigma of
criminal conviction, trials employ rules of evidence that allocate
most of the risk of error onto the prosecution—often forgoing
potentially probative evidence in order to avoid the risk bias to
the defendant.27 Many of the rules of evidence applicable at trial,
from the heightened burden of criminal proof at trials to the
exclusion of hearsay and character evidence, can be justified by
this rationale.28 Once that high threshold has been cleared and a
defendant has been convicted, however, the state is no longer
willing to forgo potentially probative evidence before it. The
allocation of error changes as the state’s role shifts from protector
of the innocent to seeker of truth.
Once a defendant is convicted, the state has a weighty
responsibility both to the defendant and to the rest of society to
evaluate the defendant as accurately as it can in order to impose
upon him the sentence most likely to rehabilitate him, to deter
others from crime, to incapacitate him if he is a danger to himself
or others, and to do justice in making up for his crime.29 Each of
Injustice: Real-Offense Sentence and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 78 MINN. L.
REV. 403 (1993).
25
Williams, 337 U.S. at 247.
26
Id.
27
ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 1 (2005) (The Rules of Evidence
were “designed to prevent tribunals concerned solely with the issue of guilt of a
particular offense from being influenced to convict for that offense by evidence that
the defendant had habitually engaged in other misconduct.”); accord Williams, 337
U.S. at 247.
28
See STEIN, supra note 27, at 183–97.
29
See Williams, 337 U.S. at 248 n.10 (sentencing judge must have full
information in order to sentence so as to bring about rehabilitation of the defendant);
accord U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.1 (2010) (detailing the goals of
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these tasks requires that the sentencing judge form as accurate a
picture as possible of the character of the defendant being
sentenced. To do these tasks well, the Williams Court reasons,
the sentencing judge’s hands cannot be tied by the full panoply of
restrictions found in the Rules of Evidence. Rather it is
“necessary that a sentencing judge not be denied an opportunity
to obtain pertinent information by a requirement of rigid
adherence to restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable to
the trial.”30 Indeed, the Court finds knowledge of prior offenses,
charged or uncharged, to be particularly important to
understanding the defendant’s character due to the “sharp
distinction[ ] . . . between first and repeated offenders.”31
Moreover, although Williams dealt with uncharged conduct
rather than prior acquitted conduct, the foregoing analysis
carries within it all the elements necessary to justify the
admission of prior acquitted conduct at sentencing. Williams’s
focus on the need for the sentencing judge to truly understand
the defendant’s character,32 coupled with its special emphasis on
the importance of recidivism as a telling feature of a defendant’s
psyche,33 leads logically to the conclusion that there are cases in
which prior acquitted conduct would be relevant to sentencing.
That is, acquittal in a criminal case does not always track
innocence. Rather, as a doctrinal matter, acquittal merely
indicates that the prosecution failed to prove at least one element
of the crime to the satisfaction of a factfinder beyond a
reasonable doubt.34
In some cases, that failure will be
attributable to the innocence of the defendant. In others,
however, a guilty defendant could be acquitted based on
prosecutorial misstep, a sympathetic jury, or the restrictions
imposed by the rules of evidence. In each of these latter cases, a
judge could—and, under Williams’s logic, perhaps should—

sentencing under the Guidelines, including deterrence, retribution, and
incapacitation). While rehabilitation is not one of the purposes of sentencing under
the Guidelines, it was a strong consideration in pre-Guidelines sentencing and, by
all evidence, continued to influence judicial decisionmaking both during the
Guidelines period and afterwards.
30
Williams, 337 U.S. at 247.
31
Id. at 248.
32
See id. at 247.
33
See id. at 248.
34
See, e.g., United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361
(1984).
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consider prior conduct of which the defendant was acquitted. A
recidivist acquitted after prosecution by an inept prosecutor has
character no different from that of the recidivist convicted by a
skilled prosecutor.
C.

One Potential Model of Extra-Trial Sentencing

Two additional aspects of Williams’s holding, which differ
from later models of extra-trial sentencing, are worthy of note.
First, in arriving at its decision, the Williams Court employed a
“totality of the circumstances” decisionmaking process that
balanced a multiplicity of factors. The Court’s decision was
predicated not only on the different theoretical purposes of
sentencing and trial and their concomitant abstract evidentiary
needs, but also on a variety of concrete indicia of reliability
particular to the case at hand. The Court noted, for example,
that Williams had been represented by counsel at his sentencing
hearing and that the highest court of the state had reviewed the
court’s factual findings—among them, the fact that the defendant
had confessed to many of the relevant prior uncharged crimes
and that he had not challenged their veracity at trial35—for an
abuse of discretion.36 The Court allowed the introduction of prior
uncharged conduct, then, not simply because sentencing is
properly a truth-seeking exercise, but also because the admitted
evidence was itself reliable. Accordingly, the need to apply those
laws of evidence designed to ensure reliability was mitigated.37
Second, Williams’s holding is framed negatively, leaving
room for as-applied challenges. Rather than holding that extratrial evidence is per se admissible, the Williams Court proffered a
much more limited holding: “We cannot say that the due-process
clause renders a sentence void merely because a judge gets
additional out-of-court information to assist him in the exercise
of this awesome power of imposing the death sentence.”38 By

35

See Williams, 337 U.S. at 244.
Id. at 252.
37
Some evidentiary rules, such as the hearsay rule, are ordered primarily
toward ensuring the reliability of evidence presented at trial. See Charles L. Barzun,
Rules of Weight, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1957, 1985 (2008) (“Of course, the purpose
of some common admissibility rules, such as the hearsay rule or the original
documents rule, is also to account for the reliability of evidence.”).
38
Williams, 337 U.S. at 252.
36
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holding only that the Due Process Clause does not per se prohibit
the use of out-of-court information at sentencing, the Williams
Court ensured that any subsequent court seeking to rely on
extra-trial evidence would be compelled to justify its actions.
One obvious way to do so would be to engage in individualized
factual considerations like those the Williams Court included in
its multi-factor evaluation of Samuel Titto Williams’s situation.
Moreover, Williams’s narrow holding reflected a minimalism that
left ample room for later courts to interpret and add to its “test,”
should they so choose. As discussed below, some courts of
appeals would choose to accept that offer.
Notwithstanding any logical groundwork that may have
been laid by the Williams Court, in the two decades following
Williams no court is recorded as sentencing any offender based
even partly based on conduct for which he had already been
acquitted.39 That is not to say, of course, that no court sentenced
any offender using his prior acquitted conduct as a sentencing
factor based on Williams during this time. Sentencing appeals
prior to the advent of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were
fewer than they are today; because judges were not required to
make public their reasoning for sentencing, objections could only
be made to their methods in the few cases in which they did
happen to idiosyncratically reveal their methods.40 Nonetheless,
an examination of law review and trade publications of the time
reveals that, if such was occurring, the trend was so diffuse as to
escape the notice of both the scholarly community and the evervigilant defense bar.

39
See infra Appendix. The one potential exception is United States v. Castaldi,
338 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1964), vacated, 384 U.S. 886 (1966). However, this case has a
very unusual fact pattern wherein the defendant was actually sentenced for
contempt for refusing to testify about a prior acquittal in front of a grand jury.
Castaldi, 338 F.2d at 884. Since the case involves another offense—contempt—it
does not fit the mold for a paradigmatic prior acquittal as sentencing factor case.
40
Indeed, prior to the Guidelines, “[g]enerally, federal sentences [were] not
reviewable.” United States v. Powell, 487 F.2d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 1973); see also Gore
v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958) (“First the English and then the Scottish
Courts of Criminal Appeal were given power to revise sentences, the power to
increase as well as the power to reduce them. This Court has no such power.”). In
the Williams case, the judge idiosyncratically revealed his methods allowed. See
Brief for Appellant-Defendant at 5, Williams, 337 U.S. 241 (No. 671).
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II. A BLUNT INSTRUMENT: § 3577 AND CONGRESSIONALLYMANDATED TRUTH-SEEKING
The eventual trend toward prior acquittal sentencing found
its catalyst in the 1970 passage of 18 U.S.C. § 3577. Later
incorporated into the Guidelines by the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 as 18 U.S.C. § 3661,41 the statute would be the point of
departure and a decisive factor in the Watts decision.42 The text
of 18 U.S.C. § 3661 provides in full: “No limitation shall be
placed on the information concerning the background, character,
and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of
the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of
imposing an appropriate sentence.”43
Although the statute served as the backbone for both the
Watts Court’s analysis and many of the lower court opinions upon
whose consensus the Watts opinion depended,44 discussion of its
origins in the sentencing literature is minimal.45 Analysis
reveals, however, that the passage of § 3661 was a turning point
in the history of prior acquitted sentencing. Moreover, § 3557’s
passage was motivated by considerations already familiar to us
from their role in the Williams decision: sentencing’s goal of
seeing a defendant as he really is and the inadequacy of the rules
of evidence in achieving that goal. Indeed, Congress explicitly
chose to intervene in the sentencing process via § 3661 because of
its concern that the gap between acquittal and innocence was
widening as a result of both the manipulations of organized crime
and the evidentiary reforms of the Warren Court. As discussed
41
See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 211, 98 Stat. 1976,
1987. For purposes of this Article, “§ 3577” and “§ 3661” will be used
interchangeably, unless used in reference to a particular time period.
42
United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 151 (1997) (per curiam) (“We begin our
analysis with 18 U.S.C. § 3661 . . . .”).
43
18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2006).
44
See, e.g., United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 636 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
45
Indeed, the only analysis of the origins of 18 U.S.C. § 3661 found in the
literature on Watts and on the use of prior convictions in sentencing comes in the
form of fleeting analysis of the provision’s inclusion in the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines in 1984. See, e.g., Joshua M. Weber, Note, United States v. Brady:
Should Sentencing Courts Reconsider Disputed Acquitted Conduct for Enhancement
Purposes Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines?, 46 ARK. L. REV. 467, 471 (1993)
(“In fact, pre-guidelines statutory language in 18 U.S.C. § 3577 was transferred,
without change, into 18 U.S.C. § 3661 of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, thus
evincing strong legislative intent that the information a judge should consider is
extensive, provided it is relevant to the offender’s characteristics or offense
circumstances.”).
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below, Congress’s response to that widening gap was far more
categorical than was the Williams Court’s. Framed affirmatively
and devoid of any suggestion of multi-factor balancing,
Congress’s response to what it saw as the evidentiary challenges
of La Cosa Nostra and the Warren Court would have significant
ramifications for prior acquittal sentencing.
A.

Combating Manipulation of Evidentiary Rules by Organized
Crime

What is now known as 18 U.S.C. § 3661 was first passed on
October 15, 1970 as 18 U.S.C. § 3577, Title X of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970.46 The Organized Crime Control Act of
1970 is most famous for its Title IX, which addresses “Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations.”47 The RICO statute has
been tremendously influential in both law enforcement and
popular culture.48 While the other titles in the statute are less
high-profile, consideration of the statute as a whole and of its
legislative history can shed light on the pressures that came to
bear in moving the country from agonizing over the
jurisprudence of Williams to easily deciding the Watts case. Most
notably, the bill’s text, history, and structure reveal a desire to
curb manipulation of evidentiary rules by sophisticated
criminals.
The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 was passed in
response to congressional findings that “organized crime in the
United States . . . annually drains billions of dollars from
America’s economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of
force, fraud, and corruption.”49 More saliently for this Article’s
purposes, the Act was passed to address the additional
congressional finding that prosecution of organized crime was
being hindered by evidentiary burdens:
[O]rganized crime continues to grow because of defects in
the evidence-gathering process of the law inhibiting the
development of the legally admissible evidence necessary to
bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the
46

Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 922.
§ 901, 84 Stat. at 941.
48
See, e.g., The Sopranos: 46 Long (HBO television broadcast Jan. 17, 1999)
(referencing the “Golden Age” as the days before RICO).
49
84 Stat. at 922.
47
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unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime and
because the sanctions and remedies available to the
Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact.50

This preamble does not appear to have been mere cheap talk.
Rather, it was a bone of contention that attracted criticism from
some of the Act’s critics. Representative Conyers, for example,
the congressman from Michigan who spoke against the bill
during the House debates on its passage, targeted this
preamble’s focus on the courts in his critiques thereof:
[T]he statement of the findings and purpose embody a very
disturbing notion to me . . . [quotes the above two passages] . . . .
....
Now I think with a bit of reflection the Members will begin to
perceive that this whole bill is based on the idea that somehow
the courts have been preventing the effective prosecution of
criminal activities in this country and that by some means or
other there are defects in the evidence-gathering processes
which this bill has sought to remedy.
I, as one Member, want to make clear a very distinct
disagreement with the primary motivation that is stated in the
purpose behind this bill. The courts have not been the major
culprits in the fight against crime. The judges have not been
the ones who have been making it difficult for prosecuting
attorneys to bring criminals in the organized syndicates to trial.
The rules of evidence, and the criminal law, have not been
derelict or weak or soft or in any way supportive of the criminal
elements once we get them into court. I think, in a nutshell,
nothing will clearly reveal the incorrect theory on which this
entire bill is based than that section that I have cited to you in
the statements of finding and purpose.51

No one rose to rebut Representative Conyers’s interpretation of
the Act or its preamble. Rather, the only response he received
was a subdued and acquiescing, “I thank the gentleman for his
very important contribution,” from Representative Bingham of
New York, a fellow opponent of the Act.52
Mr. Conyers seems to have been correct to worry that the Act
as a whole was in part an assault on, and a reformation of, the
50
51
52

Id. at 923.
116 CONG. REC. 35,214 (1970) (statement of Rep. Conyers).
Id. (statement of Rep. Bingham).
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Indeed, the stated purpose of the Act

specifically linked the former weakness in the “evidencegathering process” with “enhanced sanctions and new
remedies”53:
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized
crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in
the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal
prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new
remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in
organized crime.54

Even apart from § 3577, many aspects of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970 are addressed to evidentiary issues. As
discussed below, both the statute’s text and its legislative history
reflect Congress’s frustration that organized crime bosses, when
prosecuted, frequently managed to escape conviction through
their corruption and manipulation of the criminal justice system,
and, in particular, of the evidentiary protections that system
affords defendants.
1.

The Provisions of the Organized Crime Act of 1970

The first seven titles of the Organized Crime Act of 1970
have a particularly evidentiary focus and are seemingly geared
towards the prevention of mob manipulation of the evidentiary
protections of trial or of evidentiary limitations hindering the
prosecution of mob bosses.55 Title I of the Act, for example,

53

84 Stat. at 923.
Id.
55
As Representative Rodino explained:
Law enforcement officials know who the racket leaders are, and they know
the organizational hierarchy of the different “families” of organized crime.
This information, in fact, is freely available to the public: the most recent
organization charts of the underworld are published in the Senate hearings
on S. 30, pages 124 to 128. However, under current laws and procedures,
the men at the top are virtually untouchable because they seldom commit
crimes for which they can successfully be prosecuted. Further, they are
buffered from the law by lawyers of subordinates and flunkies to the point
where the numbers runners and narcotics pushers frequently don’t know
for whom they’re really working, and those who do know also know what
happens to “informers.” The brutality recorded in “The Godfather” pales in
comparison with some stories in the police files.
54
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allowed for the calling of “Special Grand Juries” to be convened
for eighteen-month periods “[i]n addition to such other grand
juries as shall be called from time to time” in large cities when
the Attorney General’s office decides that “a special grand jury is
necessary because of criminal activity in the district.”56 It easily
evoked the worry, substantiated by past experience, that
organized crime families might be able to taint, threaten, or
otherwise overwhelm the existing grand jury system.57
Title II provided both a carrot and a stick to prosecutors
seeking to encourage low-level mobsters to cooperate with federal
prosecutions. As a stick, it forced witnesses to testify before
federal courts, grand juries, U.S. agencies, and Congress and
removed any right they might have had to remain silent to avoid
self-incrimination. As a carrot, it immunized such witnesses
from prosecution for their testimony.58 Armed with Title II,
prosecutors could encourage low-level members of organized
crime organizations to “flip,” testifying against their old bosses.
In the process, prosecutors would not be haunted by the specter
of low-level mobsters seeking to proect their bosses through
extensive invocation of evidentiary privileges—as had been
known to occur before the passage of Title II.59
Title III allowed for contempt proceedings to be brought
against “recalcitrant witnesses,”60 adding another stick to the
bundle given to prosecutors by Title II to use against witnesses
scared of mob repercussions for their testimony. Along similar
lines, Title IV provided extra fines for those who perjure
themselves before federal courts and grand juries.61 In an effort

The major purpose of the legislation under consideration today is to provide
the criminal justice system with the necessary legal tools to get at
organized crime.
116 CONG. REC. 35,200 (1970) (statement of Rep. Rodino).
56
§ 101, 84 Stat. at 923.
57
For an account of La Cosa Nostra’s attempted tampering with juries, see
ROBERT F. KENNEDY, THE ENEMY WITHIN 62 (1960) (“When the case was retried in
the spring of 1958, Mr. Hoffa was acquitted. During this trial an attempt was
made—unsuccessfully—to influence one of the jurors.”).
58
§ 201, 84 Stat. at 927.
59
See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 57, at 210 (“On the witness stand Raddock, on
grounds of self-incrimination, would not tell us whether he knew the Gary Teamster
leader, Sawochka, or whether he had tried to fix the case for Hutcheson or the other
Carpenter officials. Sawochka also took the Fifth Amendment.”).
60
§ 301, 84 Stat. at 932.
61
§ 401, 84 Stat. at 932.
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to protect those cooperating witnesses who did “flip,”62 Title V
provided for protected facilities for housing government
witnesses.63
To preserve the testimony of witnesses imbued with
temporary courage who might be subject to later mob pressure to
change their recollection of a course of events, Title VI provided
prosecutors with the ability to take depositions to preserve the
testimony of witnesses.64 Title VII tackled the evidentiary
question directly, limiting the use of the Exclusionary Rule and
other evidentiary restrictions on “claim[s] by a party aggrieved
that evidence is inadmissible because it is the primary product of
an unlawful act or because it was obtained by the exploitation of
an unlawful act”65 by placing stringent time and disclosure limits
on when such a claim must be invoked. Notably for this Article’s
purposes, that provision is offered in direct response to “special
findings” by Congress that “claims that evidence offered in
proceedings was obtained by the exploitation of unlawful acts,
and is therefore inadmissible in evidence” are often difficult to
prove reliably, especially when there is a significant time lag
between offense and trial.66 Thus, Congress sought to protect the
government from spurious, but difficult to disprove, evidentiary
allegations by La Cosa Nostra.
Titles VIII through XI propose more substantive changes to
the criminal law. These include strengthening the
criminalization of illegal gambling, criminalizing the obstruction
of law enforcement with respect to gambling, and establishing a
commission to review national policy toward gambling (Title
VIII),67 outlawing racketeering and setting in place procedures

62
Government was, of course, already working to guard mafia informants. Joe
Valachi, who testified before the Senate in 1963, for example, was “guarded night
and day.” PETER MAAS, THE VALACHI PAPERS 55 (1968). The congressmen voting on
the Organized Crime Control Bill of 1970 would have watched Valachi’s testimony
nightly. Jay Mader, Dancer the Testament of Joseph Valachi, October–November
1963 Chapter 320, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Apr. 11, 2001, at 27.
63
§§ 501–02, 84 Stat. at 933.
64
§ 601, 84 Stat. at 934–35.
65
§ 702, 84 Stat. at 935.
66
§ 701, 84 Stat. at 935.
67
§§ 801–04, 84 Stat. at 936–40.
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for the prosecution thereof (Title IX),68 setting forth provisions for
dangerous special offender sentencing (Title X),69 and adding
additional regulation of explosives (Title XI).70
As in the evidentiary section of the bill, each substantive
provision in the Act is a near-direct response to some action
taken by organized crime organizations in the months and years
leading up to the passage of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970. In the case of Title XI, for example, Congress’s floor
discussion of the bill specifically connected the anti-explosive
legislation with “the relatively recent but extremely grave
problem of bombing incidents that have plagued the Nation”71
and “the recent rash of bombings.”72 Title IX, too, was responsive
to recent news—in his advocacy of the new racketeering
regulation, Representative Rodino of New Jersey discussed
recent events:
Time [sic] magazine reported last year that profits from the
rackets are—and I quote—“as big as United States Steel, the
American Telephone & Telegraph Co., General Motors,
Standard Oil of New Jersey, General Electric, Ford Motor Co.,
IBM, Chrysler, and RCA put together”—and most of this, of
course is untaxed.73

Thus, the provisions of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970 are the work of a Congress concerned with manipulation of
the criminal justice system—and, more specifically, of the
evidentiary safeguards surrounding defendants—by organized
crime.
The Act represents an attempt to combat that
manipulation by tightening evidentiary rules and arming
prosecutors with additional tools to use against mob
manipulation of the criminal justice system.
2.

Section 3577 in the Context of the Organized Crime Control
68

§ 901, 84 Stat. at 941–48.
§ 1001, 84 Stat. at 948–52.
70
§ 1101, 84 Stat. at 952–60.
71
116 CONG. REC. 35,199 (1970) (statement of Rep. Rodino).
72
Id. at 35,197 (statement of Rep. McCulloch).
73
Id. at 35,199 (statement of Rep. Rodino) (quoting Nation: The Conglomerate of
Crime, TIME, Aug. 22, 1969, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/
0,0171,898525,00.html).
69
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Act of 1970
Section 3577, the progenitor of 18 U.S.C. § 3661, is contained
within Title X’s enactment of a “Dangerous Special Offender
Sentencing” provision.74 Just as its general placement within the
context of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 was telling,
so too is Section 3577’s location within Title X. Section 3577
serves Title X’s larger goal of tailoring sentences to the character
of offenders, and, thus, of increasing the sentences of career
offenders like mafia members.
Title X’s overall purpose is to increase the sentences of
certain organized crime heads deemed “dangerous special
offender[s].”75 Representative Poff, one of the bill’s sponsors,
strove to explain “the full context of each title of this bill,”76
describing the background to Title X as the tendency of organized
crime heads to escape the harsh sentencing necessary to protect
society from their machinations:
A staff study made by the Criminal Laws Subcommittee of the
Senate Judiciary Committee a year ago, based upon FBI
sentencing data, indicated that two-thirds of the La Cosa
Nostra members included in the study and indicted by the
Government since 1960 have maximum jail terms of 5 years or
less. Fewer than one-fourth received maximum jail terms for
the offenses of which they were convicted. Twelve percent did
not go to jail at all. The sentences for the majority of these
organized criminals averaged only 40 to 50 percent of the
maximums which were authorized by law.77

Representative Poff coupled this reminder of the crime problem
with the now-familiar plea for individualized sentencing:
One difficulty with our sentencing law has been that, for a given
crime, every offender has been exposed to the single maximum
punishment authorized by the Congress. The emphasis has
been entirely upon the bare element of the crime which the
defendant has committed, and not upon the kind of person the
defendant is and the overall context in which the offense was
committed—the circumstances of aggravation of the offense.
Yet modern penologists believe that, in sentencing, the court
should have broad leeway to consider the criminal and the

74
75
76
77

§ 1001, 84 Stat. at 948–51.
Id. at 948.
116 CONG. REC. 35,290 (statement of Rep. Poff).
Id. at 35,296.
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circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense, as
well as the crime.78

To combat these two problems, Representative Poff’s 1970
Act proposed a new way of sentencing these “hard-core
offenders”79: the four subsections of Title X. The first subsection,
§ 3575,
established
an
elaborate—and
constitutionally
dubious80—system whereby prosecutors submitted notice to the
court specifying that the defendant at hand qualified, in their
view, as a “special offender” and detailing the reasons for that
judgment.81 Then, upon conviction, a special presentence hearing
would be held to determine whether the defendant did in fact
qualify as a “dangerous special offender” based on his previous
convictions, the fact that his felony was committed as a pattern
of conduct, or his participation in a conspiracy.82 If he was found
to fit those criteria, he could be sentenced “for an appropriate
term not to exceed twenty-five years and not disproportionate in
severity to the maximum term otherwise authorized by law for
such felony.”83 Section 3576 established an equally elaborate
system of review of sentences imposed in this unorthodox

78

Id.
Id.
80
Indeed, several of the Act’s opponents questioned the constitutionality of Title
X. See, e.g., id. at 35,289 (statement of Rep. Podell) (“Title X of the bill seems to be a
violation of the due process of law. It says: ‘If it appears by a preponderance of
evidence that the defendant is a dangerous special offender, the court shall sentence
the defendant to imprisonment for an appropriate term not to exceed 25 years.’ This
is using a lesser standard of evidence, a civil standard, in a criminal proceeding.”);
id. at 35,217 (statement of Rep. Eckhardt) (“I am most concerned, as I think some of
my colleagues have observed, about what is called the dangerous special offender
provisions of this bill and of the drug bill. It is found in this bill at title X. I would
like to say a little about it because we have to know what it means to know precisely
how it removes from the consideration of the jury a very serious element of what you
may either call crime, as I prefer to call it, or you may call a status with respect to
the nature of the dangerous special offender, as the gentleman from Virginia (Mr.
Poff) prefers to call it.”); id. at 35,208 (statement of Rep. Ryan) (“Title X, concerned
with the sentencing of so-called dangerous special offenders, is probably the grossest
refutation of due process which this bill contains.”).
81
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1001, 84 Stat. at
948 (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1982), repealed by Sentencing Reform Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212(a)(1)–(2), 98 Stat. 1837, as amended by Sentencing
Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-182, § 2, 101 Stat. 1266).
82
Id. (detailing the characteristics of a dangerous special offender).
83
§ 1001, 84 Stat. at 949.
79
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fashion, whereby either the defendant or the government could
appeal.84
Tucked away after these two major and lengthy provisions
were § 3577 and § 3578. The latter established a repository for
records of convictions and determination of the validity of such
convictions for use, presumably, in dangerous special offender
sentencing.85 Section 3577, the salient provision for this Article’s
purposes, rejects any limitation on the information sentencing
judges may consider.
Section 3577’s placement within Title X is perfectly logical.
Dangerous special offender sentencing, as proposed in § 3575,
calls for the consideration of extra-trial information in the form
of a presentence report—some of which it allowed to be withheld
from the defendant’s consideration86—as well as the filing of a
notice with the court ex parte by the prosecutor of the
justifications for the prosecutor’s opinion that the defendant
deserves a special sentence.87 Without a specific congressional
authorization of these sources, any of them could have been
subject to a due process challenge, notwithstanding the weak
denial of a categorical due process bar on extra-trial information
used at sentencing announced by the Williams Court.
Thus, § 3577, one of the main bulwarks of the Watts decision,
was passed in part to counteract the widening gap Congress
feared between acquittal and innocence in the case of mobsters,
sophisticated criminals well-able to manipulate the evidentiary
rules established to guard the rights of less sophisticated
defendants.

84

Id. at 950–51.
Id. at 951–52. The provisions of § 3578 do not specify that the records
contained in the new repository must be used only for dangerous special offender
sentencing. On the contrary, like § 3577, § 3578 does not mention dangerous special
offender sentencing. Moreover, § 3578 specifies situations other than dangerous
special offender sentencing in which the repository may be accessed, explicitly
indicating that it has a use quite apart from dangerous special offender sentencing.
Id.
86
In potential tension with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(e)(2).
87
See § 1001, 84 Stat. at 948–51.
85
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The Gap Widens Further: The Warren Court’s Exclusionary
Rule

La Cosa Nostra’s was not the only evidentiary manipulation
Congress wished to counteract through § 3577. Indeed, nowhere
did the text of § 3577 limit its reach to dangerous special offender
sentencing. Rather, § 3577 spoke in broad language. “[N]o
limitation” was to be placed on the information available to a
court sentencing any person “convicted of an offense” in a “court
of the United States.”88
This sweeping language was a feature, rather than a bug, of
the provision. Representative Poff, the driving force behind
§ 3577, billed it as of “importance not only to trials or organized
crime figures, but of criminal defendants generally.”89 The Act’s
opponents, too, seized on this fact as part of their criticism of
Title X: “Were mobsters the only victims of this assault on the
Constitution, we would still object. The fact that all defendants
are the prey of its provisions makes the title even more
indefensible.”90
Indeed, Mr. Poff explicitly framed § 3577 as having a broaderthan-mob scope, describing it as a codification of the holding of
Williams: “Title X preserves, in short, the traditional principle,
approved by the Supreme Court in Williams v. New York, that
sentencing proceedings are exempt from the rules of evidence
constitutionally required at trial. The Williams case . . . held
that a sentencing court, unlike a trial court, can consider
hearsay allegations not tested for reliability by the
constitutional procedures of confrontation and crossexamination.”91

In extolling the virtue of the Williams case, and thus of § 3577,
Poff stressed the need for full knowledge of a defendant in order
to make an accurate sentencing judgment, quoting Justice
Black’s majority opinion from Williams:

88

See id. at 951.
116 CONG. REC. 35,298 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff).
90
Id. at 34,872 (statement of Rep. Ryan) (quoting the “[d]issenting [v]iews of
Representative John Conyers, Jr., Representative Abner Mikva, Representative
William F. Ryan, on the Organized Crime Control Act”).
91
Id. at 35,194 (statement of Rep. Poff) (citations omitted) (citing Williams v.
New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949); see also Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 606
(1967).
89
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Highly relevant—if not essential—to [the sentencing judge’s]
selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the
fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and
characteristics.
And modern concepts individualizing
punishment have made it all the more necessary that a

sentencing judge not be denied an opportunity to obtain
pertinent information by a requirement of rigid adherence to
restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable to the trial.92

And yet, the language of § 3577 goes further than that of
Williams. The Williams Court framed its holding negatively, as
a refusal to find that the Due Process Clause barred the use of
extra-trial information at sentencing: “The considerations we
have set out admonish us against treating the due-process clause
as a uniform command that courts throughout the Nation
abandon their age-old practice of seeking information from outof-court sources to guide their judgment toward a more
enlightened and just sentence.”93 Section 3577, on the other
hand, was written both affirmatively and more categorically than
the Williams holding: “No limitation shall be placed on the
information concerning the background, character, and conduct
of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United
States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an
appropriate sentence.”94
While the Williams formulation, embodying a certain judicial
minimalism, easily left room for as-applied challenges that a
particular use of extra-trial information at sentencing violated
the Due Process Clause, the language of § 357795 effectively
provided a safe harbor to any sentencing judge who decided to
introduce extra-trial information as a sentencing factor. How
92

116 CONG. REC. 35,194 (statement of Rep. Poff) (quoting Williams, 337 U.S. at

247).
93

Williams, 337 U.S. at 250–51.
Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1001, 84 Stat. 922, 951 (1970) (codified as
18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1970), renumbered as 18 U.S.C. § 3561 (2006) by Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1987).
95
The language of § 3577 may reflect that of a post-Williams case. See Gregg v.
United States, 394 U.S. 489, 492 (1969) (“There are no formal limitations on
[presentence reports’] contents, and they may rest on hearsay and contain
information bearing no relation whatever to the crime with which the defendant is
charged.”).
94
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could such a decision be overturned when clear statutory
authority prohibited the imposition of any limitation on the
information available at sentencing? Moreover, § 3577 bore no
trace of the Williams Court’s careful focus on indicia of
reliability. Instead, the crystal-clear text proclaimed that no
limitation should be imposed on the evidence admissible at
sentencing.96
Nor does this alteration seem to have been accidental. The
legislative history reveals Representative Poff to have beem a
knowing architect of the change. The congressman, himself an
attorney who had originally been tapped by Nixon for Justice
Rehnquist’s seat on the Supreme Court,97 explicitly addressed the
rationale behind passing § 3577 in the course of the congressional
debates. On October 7, 1970, in the midst of congressional
debate, Poff offered a summary and defense of the Act as a whole.
He described the provision in now-familiar terms, linking it to
Williams: “Its purpose is to assure that a sentencing court will
be able to obtain all pertinent information about the background
and prior behavior of the defendant in all Federal criminal
cases.”98
Then, however, Poff’s analysis of the provision departed from
the Williams analysis, targeting one particular evidentiary rule
as part of the impetus for § 3577: “The exclusionary rules
developed for trial on the issue of guilt are not to be applied.”99
Poff went on to cite two particular appellate cases as overruled
96

§ 1001, 84 Stat. at 951.
Jeffrey Rosen, Renchburg’s the One!, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2001, at 15
(“Initially, Nixon wanted to replace Justice Black with Representative Richard Poff,
a moderate conservative from Virginia, whom Dean, then White House counsel,
respected. But Poff took himself out of the running because he feared the ensuing
publicity would force him to tell his son, then 12, that he had been adopted. (A few
weeks after Poff withdrew, a muckraking Jack Anderson column forced him to tell
the boy anyway.)”).
98
116 CONG. REC. 35,298 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff).
99
Id. (citation omitted) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3146(f) (1966), repealed by Bail
Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976, codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–56 (2006)). The statute referenced has since been repealed. Then
§ 3146(f) allowed the use of all information without evidentiary restrictions in
release hearings in non-capital cases prior to trial (bail hearings): “Information
stated in, or offered in connection with, any order entered pursuant to this section
need not conform to the rules pertaining to the admissibility of evidence in a court of
law.” Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 2, 80 Stat. 214, 215 (1966) (codified as
18 U.S.C. § 3146(f), repealed by Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat.
1976, codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–56).
97
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by the new § 3577. “The result which was obtained in Verdugo v.
United States, and the approach used in Armpriester v. United
States, are no longer to obtain.”100
Poff’s citation to Verdugo101 and Armpriester102 sheds
significant light on his reasons for expanding Williams’s holding
into the text of § 3577. The portions of the two cases he cites are
parallel in their reasoning. Both hold that evidence obtained
illegally and suppressed at trial under the Exclusionary Rule
should also be excluded from sentencing.
In Armpriester, for example, the Fourth Circuit rejected a
motion filed by pro se defendant Howard Armpriester to vacate
both the judgment against him and his sentence for altering and
uttering post office money orders.103 Armpriester’s argument
called for the Exclusionary Rule to be applied to sentencing. He
claimed that his confession had been obtained illegally due to
unnecessary delay in taking him before the nearest available
commissioner.104 As such, he argued, it was inadmissible at
sentencing.105 Moreover, the confession’s introduction at trial
had led him to give up any hope of an acquittal and to plead
guilty.106 The Fourth Circuit rejected Armpriester’s claim on the
factual grounds that the plea had almost certainly been based not
on the illegal confession, but on “the availability of the swindled
persons as witnesses and the certainty of overwhelming proof of
guilt.”107 Nonetheless, in the section of the case cited by
Representative Poff, the court indulged in extensive dicta on the
hypothetical question of what its holding would have been had
Armpriester’s factual claims held water: “If there were any basis
for a reasonable apprehension that the plea resulted from a
confession illegally obtained, the defendant might be entitled to
have the plea and the sentence stricken and a new trial

100
116 CONG. REC. 35,298 (statement of Rep. Poff) (citations omitted) (citing
Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599, 608–13 (9th Cir. 1968); Armpriester v.
United States, 256 F.2d 294, 296–97 (4th Cir. 1958)).
101
402 F.2d at 608–13.
102
256 F.2d at 296–97.
103
Id. at 295.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 296.
106
Id.
107
Id.
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granted.”108 The Armpriester court then clarified that Williams’s
holding did not extend far enough to allow the inclusion of
evidence suppressed by the Exclusionary Rule at sentencing:
A confession obtained in the circumstances alleged would
certainly not be admissible in a trial upon a plea of not
guilty. . . . It is recognized that a court has wider latitude of
inquiry in fixing the sentence than during a contest to decide an
issue of guilt. Nevertheless, we would not condone the use of
evidence obtained in breach of the law, even for the limited
purpose of determining the sentence. The rationale of the
Mallory case is that judicial proceedings shall stand or fall
independently of evidence obtained in violation of Rule 5(a).109

Thus, the Fourth Circuit made clear that, given the appropriate
case or controversy, it would hold that the Exclusionary Rule
applied to sentencing hearings, thereby hindering the truthseeking function of sentencing judges.
Verdugo, a 1968 Ninth Circuit case, relied on and extended
Armpriester, making the application of the Exclusionary Rule to
sentencing the law of the Ninth Circuit. In that case, defendant
José Verdugo filed for resentencing on grounds that his
presentence report contained information obtained from his home
in the course of an illegal search and seizure. The court excluded
the evidence both from sentencing and trial: “Verdugo’s second
claim of error relating to the presentence report is that the
inclusion in the report and consideration by the sentencing judge
of information obtained from his home by unconstitutional search
and seizure violated his rights under both the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments.”110 Relying on Armpriester, the Verdugo Court
stated:
Ours would seem like an a fortiori case, for the evidence
considered in sentencing Verdugo was obtained in violation of a
constitutional prohibition, not merely a rule of procedure.
Moreover, the exclusionary rule with which we are concerned is
a part of the constitutional right, not merely a rule of evidence
adopted in the exercise of a supervisory power.111

The Ninth Circuit then balanced the “strong public interest
in the imposition of a proper sentence—one based upon an
108
109
110
111

Id.
Id. at 296–97 (citations omitted).
Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599, 609 (9th Cir. 1968).
Id. at 610–11 (citations omitted) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)).
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accurate evaluation of the particular offender and designed to aid
in his personal rehabilitation”112 with the need to extend the
reach of the Exclusionary Rule in order to “insur[e] observance of
Fourth Amendment restraints by law enforcement officers.”113 It
finally concluded that “where, as here, the use of illegally seized
evidence at sentencing would provide a substantial incentive for
unconstitutional searches and seizures, that evidence should be
disregarded by the sentencing judge.”114
The danger Representative Poff sought to avoid, then, is
clear. With the advent of new evidentiary rules like the Mallory
Rule and the Exclusionary Rule, Poff was concerned that the
holding of Williams would not be extended to cover these rules.
Rather, Poff worried that the need to deter police abuse, a
rationale underlying the Exclusionary Rule, would be allowed to
limit sentencing judges in the information available to them at
sentencing just as juries were limited. The Exclusionary Rule
introduced into trials a significant non-truth-seeking aim. In so
doing, it widened the gap between the aims of trial and the aims
of sentencing—and, concomitantly, the gap between acquittal
and innocence—even more. Representative Poff, and ultimately
Congress, reacted to the specter of an extension of the
Exclusionary Rule’s non-truth-seeking principle into sentencing
in part by passing § 3577. This statute embodied a novel
approach to the use of out-of-court evidence at sentencing—one
whose categorical, affirmative language contrasted sharply with
the previously regnant holding of the Williams Court.
C.

A Second Model of Prior Acquittal Sentencing

A few brief remarks suffice to manifest the salient
differences between the prior acquittal sentencing regime
established by § 3577 and that of the Williams Court. First, as
discussed above, Williams’s holding merely indicated that prior
acquittal sentencing could be constitutional, leaving open the
possibility of as-applied challenges to certain instances of prior
acquittal sentencing on due process grounds. Section 3577, by
contrast, affirmatively granted sentencing judges the power to

112
113
114

Id. at 611.
Id. at 611–12.
Id. at 613.
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employ prior acquitted conduct at sentencing. Indeed, § 3577’s
direction that limits not be placed on trial judges’ ability to use
such conduct at sentencing rendered the statute a sort of safe
harbor for sentencing judges. Statutorily, they should never be
reversed on appeal for their use of prior acquitted conduct at
sentencing.
Second, § 3577’s categorical language—“no limitation”—
made no mention of any requirement that prior acquitted
conduct be verified as reliable. Rather, § 3577 seemed to provide
textually for judicial discretion of extremely broad scope, with no
requirement that any external factors be considered by a judge in
deciding whether or not to admit prior acquitted conduct as
evidence at sentencing. As illustrated below through their
application to case law in the next Part, these differences
between Williams’s holding and § 3577 would have a dramatic
effect on any sentencing decisions governed by them.
III. A NATURAL CONTROLLED EXPERIMENT: CASE LAW AFTER
§ 3577
Courts of appeals have relied on § 3577 to approve the use as
sentencing factors of hearsay evidence,115 illegally obtained
evidence,116 and alleged criminal activity for which the defendant
With these precursors, the
had not been prosecuted.117
consideration of prior acquitted conduct as a sentencing factor
seemed all but inevitable. And indeed, in sharp contrast with the
two post-Williams decades, which lacked any sign of sentencing
based on prior acquitted conduct, in the seventeen years between
the passage of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970’s
Section 3577 and the November 1, 1987, implementation of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, nine cases were appealed
because of the use of prior acquitted conduct as a sentencing
factor—a marked increase.118
115

See United States v. Garcia, 544 F.2d 681, 684 (3d Cir. 1976).
See United States v. Lee, 540 F.2d 1205, 1211–12 (4th Cir. 1976).
117
See Smith v. United States, 551 F.2d 1193, 1195–96 (10th Cir. 1977).
118
See infra Appendix. The nine cases are: Walker v. Endell, 850 F.2d 470, 477
(9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Bernard, 757 F.2d 1439, 1444 (4th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Campbell, 684 F.2d 141, 152 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v.
Lowe, 654 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Plisek, 657 F.2d 920, 928
(7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Morgan, 595 F.2d 1134, 1135 (9th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Atkins, 480 F.2d 1223, 1224 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Sweig,
116
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Perhaps because § 3577 failed to specifically address the use
of prior acquitted conduct as a sentencing factor, however, a
curious dichotomy is apparent in the post-§ 3577 case law. That
is, while a small subset of those cases based their rulings
explicitly on the statutory authority of § 3577, a substantial
majority ruled to admit prior acquitted conduct as a sentencing
factor based purely on the precedential authority of Williams and
of the then-recent cases admitting hearsay and other evidence
excludable at trial in sentencing.
The dichotomy between the two lines of cases forms a
natural experiment of sorts. The two lines of cases afford
parallel snapshots of both prior acquittal sentencing as governed
by § 3577 and of the same doctrine as it likely would have
developed in the absence of § 3577. A comparison of the two
allows certain conclusions to be drawn about the effects of § 3577
on prior acquittal sentencing.
A.

Reliance on § 3577: United States v. Plisek

Of the nine prior acquittal sentencing cases decided between
the 1970 passage of the Organized Crime Control Act and the
1987 implementation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, only
two seem to view § 3577 as determinative in their
decisionmaking: the Seventh Circuit case United States v.
Plisek,119 and the D.C. Circuit case United States v. Campbell.120
Plisek, the first prior acquittal case decided based on § 3577, is
the better model of the two for § 3577-reliant jurisprudence.121
In Plisek, the Seventh Circuit was asked to decide whether a
lower court’s use of a presentence report describing a defendant’s
prior acquittal on a murder charge warranted resentencing. The
court turned first to § 3577:
18 U.S.C § 3577 (1976) provides that “[n]o limitation shall be
placed on the information concerning the background,
character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which
a court of the United States may receive and consider for the
purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.” The broad scope

454 F.2d 181, 182–83 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Avery, 473 F. Supp. 980, 982
(S.D. Fla. 1979).
119
657 F.2d 920.
120
684 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
121
Campbell’s reference to § 3577 is so fleeting that it effectively typifies a
Williams and progeny based case more than a § 3577-based case.
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granted by § 3577 has been held to authorize trial judges to rely
on a wide range of information, including, for example, alleged
criminal activity for which the defendant has not been
prosecuted, illegally obtained evidence, and hearsay evidence.122

Plisek’s Judge Pell saw no need even to nod in the direction of the
discretion § 3577’s text – which merely forbade limitation on
what the court “may receive and consider”—left him. Rather, he
reasoned that the statute and its precedents made clear that he
was not bound to exclude any evidence from his consideration—
unless that evidence fit one of two narrow due process exceptions.
Moreover, the court relied on the legislative history of the
provision, arguing that it was intended to be read broadly: “A
broad interpretation of this language finds support in the
legislative history of § 3577, which makes it clear that the section
was intended to ‘maximize sources of sentencing information,
[and] to guard against the unnecessary formalization of
sentencing procedures.’ ”123
Thus, in Plisek, questions of
statutory interpretation—“Did § 3577’s text cover the case at
hand?” “Was it intended to be read broadly?”—all but replaced
the Williams Court’s focus on out-of-court evidence’s indicia of
reliability.
More troublingly, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial
court’s admission of prior acquitted conduct as a sentencing
factor precisely because the sentencing judge explicitly denied
doubting that the defendant’s prior acquittal indicated innocence.
In arguing that the Plisek trial judge had not placed undue
emphasis on the acquitted conduct, the Seventh Circuit’s Judge
Pell noted approvingly:
Furthermore, additional comments of the court make it clear
that he did not impose or enhance the sentence on the basis of
his evaluation of the merits of the prior acquittal. For example
he remarked, “I, of course, can’t say that merely being indicted
for a crime is a reason for putting someone in jail for some other
crime,” and later, “I can’t try that (the murder) case. He was
found not guilty. I really can’t go into the merits of it.”124

An examination of the trial transcript confirms Judge Pell’s
account. The trial judge repeatedly denied any doubt as to the
defendant’s innocence of the murder of which he had previously
122
123
124

Plisek, 657 F.2d at 925 (citations omitted).
Id. at 927 (quoting S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 90 (1969)).
Id. at 927–28.
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been acquitted. Nonetheless, in an example of truly twisted
reasoning, he decided to take the conduct into account anyway
because, “[e]ven though [defense counsel was] able to successfully
defend him in the [prior] murder charge, the fact that a person
even gets into the situation, I think, is some evidence that he has
some instability if not some proclivity to commit crimes.”125
The real harm of Williams’s replacement by § 3577’s becomes
visible. Unlike Williams’s minimalist holding, which required
judges to reason through the logic underlying prior acquittal
sentencing, the mechanical implementation of the clear,
categorical, affirmative language of § 3577 permitted sentencing
judges to use prior acquitted conduct without ruminating on its
justifications. As a result, sentencing judges and those reviewing
them on appeal were permitted to lose sight of the overarching
theoretical justification for the institution of prior acquitted
sentencing: Some acquittals do not indicate innocence and, in
those cases, sentencing judges will impose better, more accurate
sentences if they know that the offender before them is a
recidivist. To divorce prior acquittal sentencing from that logic is
to allow judges like the Plisek trial judge to sentence based on
stereotypes about the “proclivities” of defendants who have
previously been indicted.126
125

Id. at 926 n.2.
The trial transcript equally supports the alternate interpretation that the
trial judge simply doubted that Plisek’s previous acquittal indicated exoneration.
Consider the choice snippet: “Well, I am not thoroughly satisfied that that is
complete exoneration [based on self-defense] when a person is stabbed repeatedly
about the face and body during a fight. Maybe it is. I can’t try that case. He was
found not guilty. I really can’t go into the merits of it.” Id. However, if such is the
case, the havoc wreaked on the regime of prior acquitted sentencing by the
mechanistic application of § 3577 to prior acquitted sentencing is even more severe
than under the previous interpretation.
That is, under such an interpretation, the trial judge dissembled by (ineptly)
hiding his doubt about the veracity of Plisek’s previous acquittal. In doing so, he
thereby indicated his ignorance of the fact that (1) a prior acquittal not indicating
exoneration is a permissible sentencing factor and (2) assigning “proclivities” to a
class of innocent defendants is more likely to be reversible error than using
unreliable prior acquittals as a sentencing factor. What’s worse, Pell, a judge on the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, shared that ignorance, “defending” the judge on
grounds that he in no way used prior acquitted conduct as a sentencing factor, a case
he made through nearly incomprehensible prose:
[A]dditional comments of the court make it clear that he did not impose or
enhance the sentence on the basis of his evaluation of the merits of the
prior acquittal. . . . These remarks clarify the context in which the allegedly
improper concerns were voiced: they reveal that the judge did no more than
126
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In the Absence of § 3577: United States v. Sweig

Of the nine prior acquittal cases decided between § 3577’s
passage and the implementation of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, however, seven failed to invoke § 3577 entirely. Of
these, United States v. Sweig,127 the first prior acquittal case
decided post-§ 3577—and, indeed, the first clear prior acquittal
case decided post-Williams—is representative.
In Sweig, the Second Circuit rejected a defendant’s
contention that his sentence was invalid because the sentencing
judge—ironically, Judge Frankel of the Southern District of New
York—went out of his way to verbally express his reliance on
prior acquitted conduct in making his sentencing determination.
In rejecting the defendant’s claim, the Second Circuit held that
Judge Frankel had not relied on acquitted conduct.128 If he had,
however, the court maintained in dictum that that action would
not have been impermissible—“[a] sentencing judge has very
broad discretion in imposing any sentence within the statutory
limits . . . .”129 Without the benefit of § 3577 as a bulwark, the
court analyzed the nature of the acquittal in the Williams style,
arguing that
[a]cquittal does not have the effect of conclusively establishing
the untruth of all the evidence introduced against the
defendant. For all that appears in the record of the present
case, the jury may have believed all such evidence to be true,
but have found that some essential element of the charge was
not proved.130

The court then went on to analogize the use of prior acquitted
conduct to hearsay, a form of evidence admissible in sentencing,
with respect to its reliability as evidence:
examine and evaluate the presentence report and afford counsel a full
opportunity to respond to any prejudicial inferences which might have been
drawn from that section of the report.
Id. at 927–28. It is unclear what Judge Pell took the sentencing judge to have done
with the evidence of Plisek’s prior acquitted conduct or on what reasoning he
affirmed the judge’s choice to do so. What is clear, however, is that mechanistically
applying the text of § 3577, rather than prior acquittal sentencing’s underlying logic,
potentially did a grave disservice to Karel Plisek, who was sentenced based on the
“proclivity” to violence indicated by the fact that he had previously been acquitted of
murder.
127
454 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1972).
128
Id. at 181–84.
129
Id. at 183.
130
Id. at 184.
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In fact the kind of evidence here objected to may often be more
reliable than the hearsay evidence to which the sentencing
judge is clearly permitted to turn, since unlike hearsay, the

evidence involved here was given under oath and was subject to
cross-examination and the judge had the opportunity for
personal observation of the witnesses.131

Once again, two points are worthy of note. First, without the
benefit of a text categorically allowing the admission of evidence,
the court was willing—and, indeed, seems to have felt compelled
to—analyze the facts of the case and its doctrines in terms of
their underlying meanings and import. Thus, the court in Sweig,
unlike the court in Plisek, engaged in extended analysis of the
true significance of acquittal, grounding its analysis in whether a
potential disjunction between acquittal and innocence had
occurred. Moreover, to evaluate the degree to which acquittal
and innocence were coterminous in the case at hand, the Sweig
Court looked to independent indicia of reliability like the fact
that evidence had been given under oath, that the evidence had
been subject to cross-examination, and that the judge had the
opportunity for observation of the witnesses.
Second, although Sweig used the admissibility of hearsay at
sentencing as a point of comparison—much as Plisek had done—
the two courts used the example of hearsay’s admissibility in
different ways. The Plisek Court used it as a benchmark in
statutory interpretation:
If hearsay and illegally obtained
evidence are included under “no limitation,” so too should prior
acquittals be admitted. The Sweig Court, on the other hand,
used hearsay as a point of analogy: If evidence based on hearsay,
which is excluded because of concerns about its reliability, was
allowed at sentencing, why should prior acquitted conduct—
which, in many cases, may be more reliable than hearsay, since
the prior court will have done extensive fact-finding—not be
used? The Sweig Court’s analysis was deeper, more judicious,
and, ironically, more concerned with the underlying truth at
stake in the sentencing process than was the case following the

131

Id.
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path designed by Congress to emphasize the importance
sentencing’s truth-seeking function.
C.

The Two Lines of Cases Compared

The controlled experiment yields nicely contrasting results.
The Plisek Court, seeing its decisionmaking as controlled by the
categorical, affirmative language of § 3577, made its decision
without any consideration of the logic underlying prior acquittal
sentencing. Indeed, the Plisek Court did not see fit even to
mention either the evidentiary gap and difference in aims
between trial and sentencing or the true meaning of acquittal.
Moreover, the Plisek Court’s reasoning demonstrated that it had
not internalized the justifications on which the Williams Court
rested its holding. Under § 3577, the mechanized application of a
bright-line rule replaced the thoughtful consideration necessary
for just prior acquittal sentencing.
By contrast, the Sweig Court, seeing itself as governed by
Williams’s example as much as by its sparse holding, proceeded
more thoughtfully. In making its ruling, the Sweig Court was
forced by the lack of direct guidance from above to reconsider the
major rationales in favor of prior acquittal sentencing—the
different aims of trial and sentencing and the potential
disconnect between acquittal and sentencing—as well as the
presence or absence of outside indicia of the evidence’s reliability.
The result was a ruling that walked a careful line, admitting
prior acquitted conduct only in the class of circumstances in
which it was actually justifiable.
IV. PRIOR ACQUITTAL SENTENCING UNDER THE SENTENCING
GUIDELINES
While prior acquittal sentencing arose and increased
markedly after the passage of § 3577, not until the promulgation
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines did the number of appeals
for prior acquittal sentencing explode. In the ten years between
the November 1, 1987, implementation of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and the January 6, 1997, handing down of the Watts
decision, ninety-four appeals from federal cases in which prior
acquitted conduct was used as a sentencing factor would be filed,
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with cases filed in every circuit.132 Because much has been
written on the Guidelines and their tendency to render judges
less judicious,133 and because the Guidelines’ impact on prior
acquitted sentencing does not differ substantially from its impact
on other areas of sentencing, the Guidelines’ substantial impact
on prior acquittal sentencing will be addressed somewhat more
briefly.
A.

The Guidelines

In 1987, sentencing in the American criminal justice system
changed dramatically with the implementation of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984 as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984. The new Sentencing Guidelines had the purpose of
“minimizing judge-created disparities” in sentencing,134 which
Marvin Frankel’s
were becoming a national scandal.135
solution136 to the problem of radical disparities in sentencing was
to reduce judicial discretion. He attributed the disparities to “the
almost wholly unchecked and sweeping powers we give to judges
in the fashioning of sentences,”137 recommending instead,
“concrete agreement on concrete factors capable of being stated,
discussed, and thought about in the style of a legal system for
rational people rather than a lottery.”138
The Sentencing Commission, led by now-Justice Breyer, took
up the gauntlet thrown by Judge Frankel and drafted the
Federal Guidelines, an elaborate formulaic system of rational
sentencing. The Guidelines proceeded based on a
mathematical equation that begins with an offense level
depending on its seriousness. . . . That offense level is then
reduced or increased depending on factors such as the

132
See infra Appendix. As noted above, this trend occurred in part because the
Guidelines required increased reporting by judges on the rationale underlying their
sentencing, allowing for more frequent appeals.
133
See generally KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING (1998).
134
David Robinson, Jr., The Decline and Potential Collapse of Federal Guideline
Sentencing, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 881, 884 (1996).
135
See generally MARVIN FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT
ORDER (1973).
136
See generally id.
137
Id. at 5.
138
Id. at 115.
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defendant’s criminal history, level of cooperation, use of a
deadly weapon and role in the offense. . . . The sum of the
factors leads to a box on a grid that suggests a sentencing range
such as 0 to 6 months at the low end of 292 to 265 months at the
high end.139

Until the 2005 Booker decision,140 the Guidelines were mandatory
on all federal courts.141
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 adopted the former
18 U.S.C. § 3577 as its own provision 18 U.S.C. § 3661.142
Moreover, the provision was incorporated into the Guidelines
themselves
1B1.4. Information to be Used in Imposing Sentence (Selecting
a Point Within the Guideline Range or Departing from the
Guidelines): In determining the sentence to impose within the
guideline range, or whether a departure from the guidelines is
warranted, the court may consider, without limitation, any
information concerning the background, character and conduct
of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law. See
18 U.S.C. § 3661.143

In so doing, the Commission effectively transformed § 3661 from
a statute that might or might be applied in a given case—think,
for example, of Sweig—into a part of the formula necessarily
applied by judges in every sentencing. The effect was heightened
by Guideline section 1B1.3, which instructed courts to take
account of “relevant conduct” in sentencing.144 Since prior
acquitted conduct was “relevant” under the Guidelines, judges
were suddenly not only allowed to take prior acquitted conduct
into account, but were actually instructed to do so by Guidelines
with the force of law. The impact of the Guidelines on the use of
prior acquitted conduct in sentencing was immediate and
dramatic. In the ten years prior to the implementation of the
Guidelines, eight cases had dealt with the role of prior acquitted
conduct in sentencing. In the ten years following the Guidelines
arrival, ninety-three were heard.145 While there was an eleven139
Deborah Pines, After Five Years, No One Loves the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 5, 1992, at 3.
140
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
141
Id. at 245; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2006).
142
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212, 98 Stat. 1987.
143
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.4 (2010).
144
Id. § 1B1.3.
145
See infra Appendix.
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year lag between the 1970 passage of § 3577 and its first citation
in a prior acquittal case, the implementation of Sentencing
Guideline section 1B1.4 and its companion, section 1B1.3, into
caselaw took a little over a year.146
B.

From Permission to Mandate: United States v. Mocciola

In 1989, the First Circuit decided United States v.
Mocciola,147 a prior-acquittal-as-sentencing-factor case in which a
sentencing judge made use of a gun charge, of which the
defendant had been acquitted, in sentencing him for a drug
charge, of which he had been convicted. Mocciola’s analysis of
the role of prior acquittals in sentencing is standard for a postGuidelines case. Rather than engaging in a lengthy inquiry into
the purpose of sentencing and the underlying meaning of
acquittal, the court instead engaged in statutory interpretation.
After citing recent cases allowing the use of prior acquitted
conduct in sentencing, the court quoted extensively from the
Guidelines and from other cases interpreting Guideline section
1B1.3.148 The legal inquiry being thus summarily concluded, the
court inquired briefly into the reliability of the evidence
considered by the sentencing judge before affirming the sentence:
“[I]t is not clearly improbable that Mocciola’s pistol was
connected with the drug possession offense.”149
More saliently for the history of prior acquittal sentencing,
however, was the gloss the cases Mocciola cited put on the
Guidelines requirements vis-à-vis prior acquitted conduct.
Mocciola relied on other courts’ interpretation of the Guidelines
as
requir[ing] courts to take account of “relevant conduct”—
conduct that, very roughly speaking, corresponds to those
actions and circumstances that courts typically took into
account when sentencing prior to the Guidelines’ enactment.
Past practice, and authoritative case law, indicates that the
Constitution does not, as a general matter, forbid such
consideration.150

146
147
148
149
150

See infra Appendix.
891 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1989).
Id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 16. The court continues:
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In the view of the Mocciola Court, then, the Guidelines had
transformed prior acquittal sentencing. Prior acquitted conduct
was no longer merely permitted. Sentencing judges now saw
themselves as obligated to admit prior acquitted conduct into
sentencing hearings with only minimal consideration of the
reliability of the evidence supporting that conduct.151
Within three years, every circuit but the Ninth would follow
suit.152 By the time ten years had passed from the promulgation
of the Guidelines, courts of appeals were able to dispense with
appeals for use of prior acquitted conduct at sentencing in a few
paragraphs by briefly gesturing at section 1B1.3 of the
Guidelines and at a small fraction of the large body of relevant
case law.153
Prior acquittal sentencing had come a long way from its
ancestry in Williams v. New York. No longer a difficult issue
requiring the consideration of the aims and limits of complex
legal doctrines, the admission of prior acquitted conduct at
sentencing was now de rigeur, a question to be decided
automatically in the course of a few paragraphs with the help of
a manual.
The new regime was troubling in two respects. First, the
presumptive reliance on prior acquitted conduct mandated by the
Guidelines differed dramatically from the use of such conduct to
sentence the narrow class of defendants whose criminal history

The Guidelines establish both the reason for the weapons enhancement
and the circumstances in which it should be applied: “The enhancement for
weapon possession reflects the increased danger of violence when drug
traffickers possess weapons. The adjustment should be applied if the
weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was
connected with the offense. For example, an enhancement would not be
applied if the defendant, arrested at his residence, had an unloaded
hunting rifle in the closet.”
Id. at 17 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(b)(1) cmt. n.3
(2009)).
151
Indeed, Mocciola gave somewhat more consideration to the purposes of
sentencing and the reliability of the evidence underlying Mocciola’s acquitted
conduct than would other courts under the Guidelines regime. See United States v.
Slow Bear, 943 F.2d 836, 838 (8th Cir. 1991) (“Conduct which is the subject of an
acquittal may be used to enhance a sentence under the Guidelines . . . . The district
court’s enhancement of Slow Bear’s offense level for serious bodily injury was
supported by the evidence and was not clearly erroneous.”).
152
See supra text accompanying note 8.
153
For a textbook example of this approach, see United States v. Clayton, No.
96-4300, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 116 (4th Cir. Jan. 6, 1997).
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included particularly unreliable acquittals, which latter use Part
I suggested was justified.
The Guidelines’ mechanistic
imposition of a sentence predicated on prior acquitted conduct is
the antithesis of the case-by-case approach exemplified by
Williams. The Williams Court carefully inspected every facet of
Williams’s circumstances in assessing whether or not to include
his prior acquittals in the determination of his sentence. Courts
in cases like Mocciola, by contrast, simply applied the Guidelines
rule that acquitted conduct is “relevant conduct” and, thus,
applicable as a sentencing factor if it more plausibly than not
took place. Those courts did not consider the totality of the
defendant’s circumstances or the rationale underlying prior
acquittal sentencing.
Second, with the Guidelines came an unsurprising uptick in
the number of sentencings relying on prior acquitted conduct,154
even in comparison to the post-Watts era. While it is plausible
that this uptick was in some way related to an increased number
of doubtful acquittals—indeed, Representative Poff predicted
such an uptick as a result of the Warren Court’s evidentiary
reforms—such factors can not wholly explain away the increase,
given its magnitude. More likely, in taking the Guidelines as
their starting point in sentencing defendants, judges were led by
section 1B1.4 to a presumption of the consideration of prior
acquittals—a factor they might otherwise have viewed more
skeptically.
Notwithstanding its permissive language, once
§ 3661 was incorporated into the Guidelines and combined with
the Guidelines’ requirement that relevant conduct be considered
in sentencing, it was transformed into one of a host of factors
through which the court marched mechanistically in every
sentencing to which it was relevant.
V.

WATTS: THE SUPREME COURT IMPOSES A UNIFIED STANDARD

Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Watts is anything but mysterious. As a matter of precedent,
Williams had already held that out-of-court conduct could be a
valid and useful sentencing factor. Of course, the Williams Court
merely demonstrated the virtues of the “totality of the
circumstances” approach it embodied, rather than explicitly
holding that such examination be undertaken by all later courts.
154

See infra Appendix.
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Nonetheless, the legislative imposition, by both Congress and the
Sentencing Commission, of bright-line rules codifying Williams’s
result without its method rendered Watts’s decision both easy
and inevitable.
Thirty-eight years after the trial of Samuel Titto Williams,
the tale of prior acquitted sentencing achieved partial closure in
the wake of the trial of Vernon Watts. When police tracked
Watts, a probationer, to his girlfriend’s home, they found cocaine
base in her kitchen cabinets and two loaded guns with
ammunition in a bedroom closet.155 At trial, Watts was acquitted
on the firearm count. Nonetheless, in sentencing him for the
drug offense, the district court judge found by a preponderance of
the evidence that Watts had possessed the two guns in
connection with his drug offense.156 Two points were thus added
to Watts’ base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines.157
With the addition of the two base offense level points, Watts was
sentenced to 262 months of incarceration and sixty months of
supervised release.158 When Watts appealed on due process
grounds, the Ninth Circuit vacated his sentence, holding that a
sentencing judge does not have the power “ ‘under any standard
of proof,’ [to] rely on facts of which the defendant was
acquitted.”159
The government petitioned for certiorari, and the Court
“GVRed.” That is, in its grant of certiorari, the Court also
vacated the Ninth Circuit’s ruling and remanded to the lower
court with directions to apply a different rule of law, all without
the benefit of oral argument or merits briefing.160 The new rule,
set forth by the Supreme Court as the law of the land, held that
“a jury’s verdict of acquittal does not prevent the sentencing
court from considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge,
so long as that conduct has been proven by a preponderance of
the evidence.”161
In some sense, the Court’s decision was a foregone
conclusion, given the occupation of the field by a congressional

155
156
157
158
159
160
161

United States v. Watts, 67 F.3d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 1995).
Id.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(b)(1) (2009).
Watts, 67 F.3d at 793.
Id. at 797 (emphasis in original).
United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997) (per curiam).
Id.
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statute, the Guidelines, and the Court’s own prior precedent.
And, indeed, the Watts Court predicated its holding explicitly on
18 U.S.C. § 3661’s162 provision that “[n]o limitation shall be
placed on the information concerning the background, character,
and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of
the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of
imposing an appropriate sentence.”163 This provision gained
strength, the Court argued, from being incorporated into the
Guidelines as section 1B1.4: “In determining the sentence to
impose within the guidelines range, or whether a departure from
the guidelines is warranted, the court may consider, without
limitation, any information concerning the background, character
and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by
law.”164 These two provisions, the Court continued, were part
and parcel with a series of Supreme Court cases holding that
sentencing courts were permitted to consider extra-trial facts
during sentencing, most saliently the 1949 Supreme Court case
Williams v. New York.165
While the Watts decision should certainly be taken as a
broad ratification of the use of prior acquitted conduct at
sentencing, two aspects of the Watts holding give rise to a more
nuanced evaluation of the Court’s handiwork.
First, the
language of Watts’s holding stakes out a middle way between the
restrained ambiguity of Williams and the categorical language of
§ 3661, as incorporated into the Guidelines. That is, the Watts
Court’s holding that “a jury’s verdict of acquittal does not prevent
the sentencing court from considering conduct underlying the
acquitted charge”166 is akin to Williams’s holding in its negative
formulation; it merely establishes that the bare fact that conduct
underlies an acquitted charge does not render it per se
inadmissible in sentencing. That holding is a far cry from
§ 3661’s affirmation that “no limitation” may be put on the
evidence that a court may consider. Indeed, Watts’s language
both leaves room for as-applied challenges and succeeds in
placing more emphasis on the permissive nature of the holding.
The provision begins not with the absence of limitation on the
162
163
164
165
166

Id. at 151.
18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2006).
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.4 (2010).
Watts, 519 U.S. at 165.
Id. at 157.
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admitted evidence but rather on the fact that the sentencing
court is not prevented from using the evidence—but not required
to do so either.
Second, the Watts Court, for the first time, introduced an
explicit reliability component into the test for admissibility of
prior acquitted conduct.
The Court’s holding stated quite
explicitly that prior acquitted conduct would be introduced only
when it was “proved by a preponderance of the evidence.”167 That
evidentiary standard contrasted sharply both with § 3661, whose
“no limitation” standard acknowledged no explicit caveat for
reliability, and with the holding of Williams, which analyzed
indicia of reliability without enshrining the need to do so in its
holding.168 Notable, too, is the fact that the reliability standard
imposed by the Watts Court textually constitutes a floor, not a
ceiling. That is, no prior acquitted conduct may be admitted
under Watts that is proved by less than a preponderance of the
evidence. No textual portion of Watts, however, prohibits a
sentencing judge from subjecting prior acquitted conduct to a
higher standard, up to and including the “proof beyond a
reasonable doubt” standard used at trial.
VI. PRIOR ACQUITTAL SENTENCING IN A POST-BOOKER WORLD
For the first few years after the Watts case, its holding
coexisted with the mandatory Guidelines. However, since the
Court’s holding in the 2005 Booker169 decision, the Guidelines are
now merely advisory, leaving Watts as the main authority
governing prior acquittal sentencing.170 More broadly, the Booker
decision moves the dominant sentencing regime closer, as a
doctrinal matter, to a pre-Guidelines regime of discretion in
sentencing. The question of how the prior acquittal sentencing
landscape will change under this new regime is as yet
167

Id. at 156.
As a doctrinal matter, courts had imposed extra-textual due process
limitations on § 3577, including an exclusion of felony convictions obtained
unconstitutionally due to a deprivation of counsel, United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S.
443 (1972), and an exclusion of misinformation submitted by the prosecution when
an uncounseled defendant had no opportunity to prevent the court from being
misled, Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740–41 (1948).
169
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
170
Section 3661 is, of course, still in force. However, Watts, as the dominant
interpretation thereof with respect to prior acquittal sentencing, is the law of the
land in this area.
168
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unanswered, however. As in many other aspects of sentencing, it
is not fully clear how the reintroduction of discretion into a
system governed by mechanization for over a decade will be
embraced by sentencing judges.

This Part seeks to demonstrate that, as a doctrinal matter,
judges have the discretion to limit their use of prior acquitted
conduct in sentencing. Further, it argues that to do so would be
wise as a policy matter.
A.

Judicial Discretion

Although judges have not always seen fit to employ it, the
language in both Watts and § 3577 grant sentencing judges a
large degree of discretion in deciding whether or not to consider
prior acquitted conduct at sentencing. Indeed, both texts are
decidedly permissive, rather than mandatory.
Watts, for
example, provides that “a jury’s verdict of acquittal does not
prevent the sentencing court from considering conduct underlying
the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been proved by
a preponderance of the evidence.”171 Nothing in either text orders
judges to consider prior acquitted conduct in sentencing or even
hints at threatening them with reversal if they fail to do so.
Indeed, even the less-permissive text of § 3661 provides merely
that “[n]o limitation” be placed on the information “a court of the
United States may receive and consider for the purpose of
imposing an appropriate sentence.”172 Again, a careful reading of
the statute indicates that it merely allows judges to consider
prior acquitted conduct in sentencing, without mandating that
they do so.
Nor did the Guidelines change the text of § 3661 when
incorporating it into section 1B1.4 of the Guidelines; the
provisions continued in its original permissive formulation.
Moreover, even accepting a strong reading of the Guidelines’
requirements,173 the Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed the
171

Watts, 519 U.S. at 156 (emphasis added).
18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2006).
173
See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d 437, 441 (1st Cir. 1989) (accepting
as binding the fact that “Guideline § 1B1.3 requires courts to take account of
‘relevant conduct’ ”). Wright was later relied upon in Mocciola. United States v.
Mocciola, 891 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1989).
172
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advisory nature of the Guidelines, post-Booker. Indeed, in the
face of judicial hesitancy to depart from the Guidelines, the Court
has stressed this discretion over and over again, holding three
times over the last three terms that judges are free to use their
discretion to depart from the Guidelines, even for policy-based
reasons.174 In the face of this repeated affirmation of their
discretion by the Supreme Court, it is unquestionable that judges
have the discretion to choose not to admit evidence of prior
acquitted conduct, should they so wish.
B.

Policy Considerations

In many cases, exercising such restraint would be in
accordance with sound public policy. As discussed above, prior
acquittal sentencing is justified by the truth-seeking function of
sentencing only in the narrow class of cases in which acquittal
does not indicate innocence. It stands to reason, then, that
judges should take special care to avoid using prior acquitted
conduct as a sentencing factor in cases outside that narrow class.
To do so, judges may wish to require independent indicia of
reliability for all prior acquitted conduct they use at sentencing
or hold that conduct to a higher standard of proof than the
“preponderance of the evidence standard” floor required by
Watts.
Other considerations, however, argue in favor of judges
exercising restraint in their use of prior acquitted conduct even
in the narrow class of cases where they know that a prior
acquittal does not indicate innocence.
Some of these
considerations are discussed below.
The Power of the Probation Officer. To allow evidence of
acquitted conduct to be considered “relevant” for purposes of
sentencing is to give extraordinary power to the person who sets
down in writing the details of what occurred during the prior
incident leading to trial and acquittal.
This person, the
probation officer who assembles the presentence report (“PSR”),
will often be the only source of information the sentencing judge
has before him when trying to determine whether the previous
acquittal is in fact an acquittal on account of innocence or is an

174

See, e.g., Nelson v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 890, 892 (2009); Spears v. United
States, 129 S. Ct. 840, 843 (2009); United States v. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. 85, 109–10
(2007).
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acquittal based on insufficient evidence to convict the defendant
of a serious crime, the committing of which speaks to his
character, his ability to be rehabilitated, and his potential
dangerousness.175
While probation officers are criminal justice professionals,
they are also closely involved in the lives of offenders and their
communities.176 This connection to the community is beneficial
in many contexts: It both allows probation officers to be a
positive force in offenders’ lives and to obtain more accurate
information on the offenders and communities their reports
concern. Nonetheless, it also engenders the specter of bias born
of the mixing of personal and professional relationships.
In addition, the position of probation officer does not require
the same level of training and educational attainment that our
society expects from an Article III judge. In most states and
jurisdictions, the only educational requirement to work as a
probation officer is a “bachelor’s degree in social work, criminal
justice, psychology, or a related field.”177 Undoubtedly, many—if
not most—probation officers are dedicated and experienced
professionals. Nevertheless, if we are truly given pause by the
idea of discretionary sentencing by judges who possess graduate
degrees and years of experience in sentencing, delegating much
of that discretionary power to overtaxed officials with less
training should perhaps give us additional pause.
The Risk of Unfettered Judicial Discretion. The Sentencing
Guidelines were first enacted primarily to counter the problem of
judicial sentencing discretion so unfettered it was “terrifying and
intolerable for a society that professes devotion to the rule of

175

This “problem” is mitigated by the procedural safeguard surrounding
presentence reports. See Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, under which the
court is permitted to treat the PSR as its finding of fact, except in the case of material
subject to the parties’ unresolved objections. These procedural safeguards, however,
require diligence on the part of the defendant’s attorney.
176
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, 2010–
2011 EDITION: PROBATION OFFICERS AND CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT SPECIALISTS
(2009), available at http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos265.htm#training (“Probation and
parole officers supervise offenders on probation or parole through personal contact
with the offenders and their families. Instead of requiring offenders to come to them,
many officers meet offenders in their homes and at their places of employment or
therapy. Probation and parole agencies also seek the assistance of community
organizations, such as religious institutions, neighborhood groups, and local
residents, to monitor the behavior of many offenders.”).
177
Id.
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law.”178 Marvin Frankel’s definitive work on the topic, Criminal
Sentences: Law Without Order,179 effectively argued that
affording unrestrained sentencing discretion to judges resulted in
both arbitrary sentencing and a wide disparity of sentences being
imposed on similarly situated defendants. While allowing judges
the discretion to decide whether or not to use prior acquitted
conduct as a sentencing factor would afford them much less
discretion than that granted to them pre-Guidelines, introducing
any amount of additional discretion into sentencing potentially
allows for arbitrary determinations by judges and disparities
between similarly-situated defendants.180
Indeed, the more
broadly courts rely on prior acquitted conduct in sentencing, the
more discretion they have.
Due Process Concerns. While sentencing hearings are not
afforded the full due process protections required at trials,181
there is nonetheless a strong argument to be made that in an era
when more than ninety percent of criminal cases end in plea
bargains182 and when a defendant’s primary day in court, as well
as the day that determines his fate, is his sentencing hearing,
due process values should at least guide those hearings. While
this concern does not necessary dictate the application of the full
panoply of due process rights accorded to defendants at trial, it
may lead judges to consider refraining from the use of prior
acquitted conduct at sentencing.

178

FRANKEL, supra note 135, at 5.
See generally id.
180
This problem may have the effect of disproportionately widening racial
disparities in sentencing. See generally Larry Michael Fehr, Racial and Ethnic
Disparities in Prosecution and Sentencing: Empirical Research of the Washington
State Minority and Justice Commission, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 577 (1996); David B.
Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the
U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 285 (2001); Samuel L. Myers, Jr., Racial
Disparities in Sentencing: Can Sentencing Reforms Reduce Discrimination in
Punishment?, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 781 (1993); Douglas Smith, Narrowing Racial
Disparities in Sentencing Through a System of Mandatory Downward Departures, 2
AM. U. MOD. AM. 32 (2006).
181
See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 251–52 (1949) (allowing extra-trial
evidence in sentencing hearings); see also United States v. Malouf, 466 F.3d 21, 25
(1st Cir. 2006) (holding that sentencing factors need only be proved by a
“preponderance of the evidence” (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91
(1986))).
182
See Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining, 75 TUL. L. REV. 695, 700
(2001) (“Despite the fact that there is no right to a negotiated plea, most—if not
virtually all—criminal cases result in a guilty plea.”).
179
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Expressive Meaning of Acquittal. As discussed above, the
prior acquittal sentencing regime derives justification from the
fact that acquittal is not coterminous with a determination of
innocence. While this is certainly true as a matter of doctrine,183
it would come as a surprise to most laymen. Indeed, there is a
widely-held public perception that an acquitted defendant has
been “found innocent,” an opinion that is widely reflected in
media reporting of trials.184 Challenging a widely held, erroneous
public perception is certainly not problematic per se; indeed, if
the Watts decision had encouraged Americans to learn about the
criminal justice system, it could have constituted a teaching
moment in American civic literacy. However, as the public
perception of acquittal seems not to have changed in the wake of
the Watts decision,185 the effect of Watts is merely to create
cognitive dissonance among the American people.
Insofar as the public is aware of prior acquittal sentencing,
however, this cognitive dissonance could potentially have several
deleterious effects on the criminal justice system. First, by
allowing a seeming injustice—sentencing a defendant for conduct
of which he was “innocent”—to be part of the fabric of the law,
the Watts decision’s admission of prior acquittals in sentencing
undermines the claim of the criminal justice system to be doing
justice, and thus its broader legitimacy. That is, if an onlooker
sees a defendant sentenced in part for acquitted conduct that the
onlooker codes as “conduct of which the defendant was innocent,”
he will assume the criminal justice system is unjust and cease to
put faith therein.
Second, this potential cognitive dissonance undermines the
degree to which an acquittal may have an effect analogous to
that of “clearing title” in property law. Because the American

183
See United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361
(1984); see also United States v. Putra, 78 F.3d 1386, 1394 (9th Cir. 1996) (Wallace,
J., dissenting).
184
See Joh, supra note 5, at 903 n.87 (“In our system, not only are you presumed
innocent, but when a jury returns a verdict of not-guilty you are, in fact, innocent.”
(quoting Peter Neufeld, defense attorney in Simpson trial)); id. at 903 n.88
(“[William Kennedy] Smith was found innocent . . . .” (quoting Anne Simpson,
HERALD (Glasgow), May 13, 1997, at 17)); id. at 903 n.89 (“We know that we had the
trial with Stacy Coons [sic] in the Rodney King incident. And he was found innocent
the first trial [sic] . . . .” (quoting from the transcript of the Rodney King (Stacy
Koons) trial)).
185
See id. at 903 n.87 (citing post-Watts news reports).

CP_McCusker (Do Not Delete)4/4/2011 2:13 PM

1464

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:1415

system has only two verdicts—guilt proved beyond a reasonable
doubt and guilt not proved beyond a reasonable doubt—both the
innocent and the guilty whom the prosecution lacked the
evidence to convict receive the same sentence: acquittal.
Although some have suggested establishing such an
institution,186 at present there is no verdict whereby a criminal
defendant may definitively prove his innocence and have that
innocence be certified by the state. Thus, acquittals must be
used as a proxy for declarations of innocence, lest criminal
defendants be subject to the stigma of criminality merely by
being charged with a crime. Indeed, many courts have gone out
of their way to stress the degree to which acquittals, whatever
the legal standard necessary to achieve them, ought to be
considered declarations of innocence:
A not guilty judgment is more than a presumption of innocence;
it is a finding of innocence. And the courts of this state,
including this Court, must give exonerative effect to a not guilty
verdict if anyone is to respect and honor the judgments coming
out of our criminal justice system.187

Given, then, that acquittals are the sole manner of “proving”
innocence in our system, we should pause before blurring the
innocence-denoting function of acquittals by allow prior acquitted
conduct to be used in sentencing on the theory that acquittal and
innocence routinely diverge.
Undermining General Deterrence as a Rationale for
Punishment. In sussing out the Williams Court’s justification for
its holding, this Article noted above that seeing a defendant
clearly in his actual behavior and character is necessary for three
of the purposes of sentencing: rehabilitation, incapacitation, and
retribution. In each case, the ability to properly sentence any
defendant is predicated on the ability to correctly assess the
defendant’s character and conduct, a necessity that weighs in
favor of allowing the consideration of some prior acquitted
conduct. It is worth noting, however, that in the case of another

186
See generally Samuel Bray, Comment, Not Proven: Introducing a Third
Verdict, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1299 (2005). Cf. California Seeks Change in Verdict
Terms, UNITED PRESS INT’L (Sacramento), Jan. 23, 1996 (discussing Senator
Quentin Kopp’s attempt in 1996 to change acquittal verdicts in California from “not
guilty” to “not proven guilty” in order to alleviate “confusion”).
187
McNew v. State, 391 N.E.2d 607, 612 (Ind. 1979).
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of the Guidelines’ stated goals, deterrence of future crime,188
additional information about the defendant is not always useful
useful. Rather, sentencing a defendant in accord with additional
information in the form of prior acquitted conduct may actually
be counter-productive.
General deterrence differs from the other rationales for
punishment in that it is ordered not toward how an offender is,
but toward how he seems. That is, deterrence works not on
defendants themselves but on third parties observing them. The
theory of deterrence posits that punishing criminals allows them
to serve as a warning to other criminals, thereby deterring other
criminals from committing potential crimes.189
In setting
punishments, deterrence theory invokes a law and economics
style approach, with analysis mirroring the punitive damages
analysis used in torts. That approach presupposes—undoubtedly
correctly—that the majority of those who commit any given crime
are not caught. It argues that this is a problem because, from a
criminal’s point of view, the expected “value” of committing a
crime may be higher than that of not committing a crime. Say,
for example, that a thief steals cars, the average value of which is
$10,000, and that it is worth $10,000 to him not to go to jail for
one year. If thieves were caught every time they stole, the proper
deterrent “value” of his sentence would be one year in jail for
each car he stole.
The deterrence theory of punishment,
however, posits that the thief will be caught not every time he
steals, but rather every five times he steals. As such, it would set
the punishment for stealing cars at five years in jail, so that it
would not be “rational” for a thief to steal cars, given the penalty
he might face if he did.
The key difference between the deterrence approach to
punishment
and
the
rehabilitative,
retributive,
and
incapacitative theories of punishment is that deterrence is not
primarily ordered toward or focused on the offender at hand. On
188

Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 73 Fed. Reg. 26,924 (May 9,
2008) (“The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (Title II of the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984) provides for the development of guidelines that will further the
basic purposes of criminal punishment: Deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment,
and rehabilitation.”).
189
Throughout this Subsection, see generally Dru Stevenson, Toward a New
Theory of Notice and Deterrence, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1535 (2005); Samuel Kramer,
Comment, An Economic Analysis of Criminal Attempt: Marginal Deterrence and the
Optimal Structure of Sanctions, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 398 (1991).
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the rehabilitative model, a defendant is punished with the hope
of curing him of his deviancy. On the retributive model,
punishment serves to make the defendant pay for what he has
done. When sentencing with an eye towards incapacitation, a
judge hopes to keep a dangerous defendant from hurting others.
On the deterrence theory of punishment, by contrast, the judge
hopes to deter both the defendant and other members of his
community who know of his punishment from committing crimes
in the future. Punishment is ordered toward changing not only
the defendant’s behavior, but the behavior of those around him.
To change a defendant’s behavior, you must understand him;
you must know how bad he really is. To change the behavior of
those around him, you must know how bad he seems. Thus, for
the deterrent message to be properly conveyed and received, it
must be clear for what act the defendant is being punished. If he
is punished excessively for some secret fact unknown to the
outside world, or if his sentence is lessened due to some secret
aspect of his life the average onlooker could not detect, the value
of the message conveyed by the deterrence is not only diluted but
perverted. The message received by the onlooker will be that
punishment for the crime at hand is either more or less than it
really is.
Due to the popular perception that acquittals are a sure
indicator of innocence, reliance on prior acquitted conduct as a
sentencing factor could have the same effect on the deterrent
value of sentencing that sentencing based on a secret factor
would. It would distort the message received by those meant to
be deterred, encouraging them to think that certain crimes were
awarded much higher punishments than they actually were.
This problem, however, is likely not as serious as some of the
others considered above. In torts and contract, it is important to
set the deterrent value carefully so that it neither under-deters,
allowing undesirable tort-causing and contract-breaching to
occur, nor over-deters, allowing sensitive plaintiffs to put the
kibosh on nuisances that are benign in society’s eyes or
preventing efficient breach.190 By contrast, in the context of the
190
Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic
Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 284 (1970) (“Repudiation of obligations should be
encouraged where the promisor is able to profit from his default after placing his
promisee in as good a position as he would have occupied had performance been
rendered.”). See generally Charles G. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages,
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criminal law, it seems that there is no such thing as overdeterring crime; crime is both per se bad for society as well as
inefficient. It is certainly possible to over-punish an offender by
meting out to him more punishment than he deserves in justice.
It is not, on the other hand, possible to over-deter onlookers by
making punishment seem too disproportionate—within reason.191
Moreover, unlike tort or contract scenarios, where it is easy to
put a price tag on the imposition of a nuisance or the breach of a
contract, in the criminal sphere there is, in most cases, no onesize-fits-all equation between offenses and the severity of
punishment imposed for them. Consider for example, the
extreme sentencing disparities for the same crime between the
United States and Europe.192 As such, the worry about overdeterrence of crime seems to mistake how finely tuned the
matching of punishments to deterrence of crime in fact is.
While such considerations must be carefully balanced
against the advantages of prior acquittal sentencing in cases
where acquittal does not indicate innocence—namely, the good of
sentencing offenders accurately in accordance with their true
character—they are nonetheless worthy of consideration in any
judge’s decision of how to exercise discretion most wisely in the
wake of Booker.
CONCLUSION
This Article has traced the history of prior acquittal
sentencing from its foreshadowing in the 1949 Williams decision
through the two legislative interventions of § 3577 and the
Sentencing Guidelines to its ultimate legitimization as
permissible practice in the 1997 Watts decision. From that
history, several themes and conclusions have emerged.
First, sometimes less is more. The Williams decision’s
minimalist holding provided that the use of extra-trial
Penalties, and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement
Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977).
191
Certainly, if the populace perceived that brutally harsh punishments were
meted out for minor infractions, the expressive value of that punishment could
produce barbarism—or revolt.
192
See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs Other Nations’, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 23, 2008, at A1 (“Americans are locked up for crimes—from writing bad
checks to using drugs—that would rarely produce prison sentences in other
countries. And in particular they are kept incarcerated far longer than prisoners in
other nations.”).
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information at sentencing was not a per se violation of the Due
Process Clause. The limited guidance offered by that holding,
combined with the example offered by the Court in its own
decisionmaking process, engendered progeny like United States
v. Sweig.
Sweig carefully reasoned that prior acquittal
sentencing should be permitted only in the narrow class of cases
where acquittal does not indicate innocence and, thus, where
prior acquitted conduct reveals elements of the defendant’s
character useful to the sentencing judge. Following Williams’s
example, the Sweig court considered various indicia of reliability
in deciding whether prior acquitted conduct should be used at
sentencing.
Section 3577 provided a useful foil to the Williams Court’s
minimalism, mandating that no limitation be put on the
information a sentencing judge was allowed to consider.
Motivated by concern for the manner in which trials had been
driven away from truth-seeking by mafia manipulation and the
criminal procedure reforms of the Warren Court, Congress
intervened in categorical language. In doing so, it effectively
insulated judges from reversal for sentencing defendants based
on their prior acquitted conduct. As prior acquittal sentencing
cases decided under § 3577 demonstrate, providing judges with a
bright-line resolution to a complicated issue sometimes
engenders mechanization without understanding. Indeed, in
cases like United States v. Plisek, courts would have benefited
from the deliberation-forcing aspect of Williams’s ambiguity.
Performing the intellectual heavy-lifting of thinking through the
justifications for prior acquittal sentencing would have forced the
Plisek court to understand the boundaries of the narrow class of
cases in which prior acquittal sentencing was justified.
That
mechanization
was
later
systematized
and
universalized with the promulgation of the Sentencing
Guidelines, which incorporated § 3577, thereby placing prior
acquitted conduct in the category of “relevant information”
judges were bound to consider at sentencing. Guidelines cases
would betray a mechanical application of § 3577’s admission of
prior acquitted conduct with very little exercise of discretion.
With the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Booker and
Watts, however, discretion is again at the fore. Under Booker,
the Guidelines are no longer mandatory on judges. Under Watts,
prior acquittal sentencing is permitted but not mandated, and a
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hard floor of reliability is established in the form of the
requirement that prior acquitted conduct be proved to a
preponderance of the evidence. The degree to which that
discretion is exercised by judges now accustomed to minimally
discretionary Guidelines sentencing remains to be seen.
Second, while prior acquittal sentencing is logically justified
in a narrow class of cases, it may be imprudent even in those
cases. Consideration of prior acquittal sentencing’s history
allows us to formulate a recommendation on how best to exercise
that discretion. As we have seen, decisions like Williams, Sweig,
and Watts provide the makings of a strong logical argument in
favor of the use of prior acquitted conduct as a sentencing factor
in certain cases.
Those cases argue compellingly that
sentencing’s goals differ from those of trials. Unlike trials,
sentencings must strive above all for clarity. The sentencing
judge must see the defendant as he truly is in order to sentence
him justly in accordance with the gravity of his crime and in
order to know whether and to what degree incapacitation is
necessary. To the degree a sentencing judge is sub silentio
relying on a defendant’s potential for rehabilitation, accurate
knowledge of his character is equally necessary.
Because
acquittal indicates not innocence but an inability by the
prosecution to prove each element of the case against the
defendant, there exists a narrow class of cases in which a
convicted defendant was previously acquitted of a crime he had
actually committed. In that narrow class of cases, consideration
of prior acquitted conduct will allow that defendant to be
sentenced more accurately, particularly given the high probative
value recidivism holds in demonstrating a defendant’s character.
However, winnowing the class of defendants with prior
acquittals down to those previously convicted of a crime they
actually committed is a difficult task. To accomplish that task,
courts should, at the very least, exercise the discretion granted
them by law to require external indicia of reliability before
relying on evidence of prior acquitted conduct. Further, they
should consider requiring a more stringent level of proof than a
mere preponderance of the evidence. Finally, before admitting
evidence of prior acquitted conduct even in that narrow class of
cases, courts should think seriously about the compelling public
policy reasons for not engaging in prior acquittal sentencing.
Those include the risk of undermining the expressive meaning of
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acquittal, of spoiling the deterrence function of sentencing, or of
according too much power and discretion to probation officers
and judges. While not necessarily determinative, those factors
should be taken into account by judges in deciding how best to
reassert their rediscovered discretion.
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APPENDIX
CASES ADDRESSING THE PERMISSIBILITY OF PRIOR
ACQUITTAL SENTENCING
* Court found for defendant, excluding prior acquitted
conduct at sentencing
~ Case too idiosyncratic or vague to reliably include in
statistics

1

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Cases Decided Before October 14, 1970
(Prior to § 3577)
~United States v. Castaldi, 338 F.2d 883 (2d Cir.
1964).
Cases Decided October 14, 1970–November 1, 1987
(Post-§ 3577, Pre-Guidelines)
United States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d 181 (2d Cir.
1972).
United States v. Atkins, 480 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir.
1973).
~United States v. Avery, 473 F. Supp. 980 (S.D.
Fla. 1979).
United States v. Morgan, 595 F.2d 1134 (9th Cir.
1979).
~United States v. Lowe, 654 F.2d 562 (9th Cir.
1981).
United States v. Plisek, 657 F.2d 920 (7th Cir.
1981).
United States v. Campbell, 684 F.2d 141 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
United States v. Bernard, 757 F.2d 1439 (4th Cir.
1985).
Walker v. Endell, 850 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1987).
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Cases Decided November 1, 1987–January 6, 1997
(Post-Guidelines, Pre-Watts)
United States v. Perez, 858 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir.
1988).
United States v. Ryan, 866 F.2d 604 (3d Cir.
1989).
United States v. Juarez-Ortega, 866 F.2d 747
(5th Cir. 1989).
United States v. Isom, 886 F.2d 736 (4th Cir.
1989).
United States v. Ford, 889 F.2d 1570 (6th Cir.
1989).
Delap v. Dugger, 890 F.2d 285 (11th Cir. 1989).
United States v. Mocciola, 891 F.2d 13 (1st Cir.
1989).
United States v. Funt, 896 F.2d 1288 (11th Cir.
1990).
United States v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d
177 (2d Cir. 1990).
United States v. Vandervelden, No. 89-1345,
1990 WL 51380 (6th Cir. Apr. 23, 1990).
United States v. Duncan, 918 F.2d 647 (6th Cir.
1990).
Stewart v. Roland, No. 89-15936, 1990 U.S. App.
LEXIS 22101 (9th Cir. Dec. 18, 1990).
United States v. Bertucci, 730 F. Supp. 1483
(E.D. Wis. 1990).
United States v. Averi, 922 F.2d 765 (11th Cir.
1991).
*United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844 (9th Cir.
1991).
United States v. Rivera-Lopez, 928 F.2d 372
(11th Cir. 1991).
United States v. Lawrence, 934 F.2d 868 (7th Cir.
1991).
United States v. Lynch, 934 F.2d 1226 (11th Cir.
1991).
United States v. Slow Bear, 943 F.2d 836 (8th
Cir. 1991).

CP_McCusker (Do Not Delete)4/4/2011 2:13 PM

2010]
20
21
22
24

25
26
27

28
29
30
31
32

33
34
35

36
37

HARD CASES MAKE GOOD LAW
Moreno v. United States, No. 91-1572, 1991 U.S.
App. LEXIS 22705 (6th Cir. Sept. 23, 1991).
United States v. Romulus, 949 F.2d 713 (4th Cir.
1991).
United States v. Ailemen, No. 90-10375, 1991
U.S. App. LEXIS 30312 (9th Cir. Dec. 17, 1991).
United States v. Blyden, 964 F.2d 1375 (3d Cir.
1992).
United States v. Vineyard, Nos. 91-5173, 5174,
1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14737 (4th Cir. June 24,
1992).
United States v. Fields, No. 91-1910, 1992 U.S.
App. LEXIS 8770 (1st Cir. Feb. 26, 1992).
United States v. Martin, No. 91-4076, 1992 U.S.
App. LEXIS 18516 (6th Cir. July 28, 1992).
United States v. Hasting, Nos. 91-6234, 6311,
1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 21595 (6th Cir. Sept. 1,
1992).
United States v. Neris, No. 91-5391, 1992 U.S.
App. LEXIS 22188 (4th Cir. Sept. 11, 1992).
United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502 (6th
Cir. 1992).
United States v. Martin, No. 91-4076, 1992 U.S.
App. LEXIS 26283 (6th Cir. Oct. 7, 1992).
United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.
1992).
United States v. Cheatham, Nos. 91-5195, 5199,
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1992).
United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369 (2d
Cir. 1992).
United States v. McIntosh, Nos. 91-6236, 6284,
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(6th Cir. Dec. 29, 1992).
United States v. Smith, No. 92-5005, 1992 U.S.
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United States ex rel. Jackson v. Roth, No. 93 C
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1993).
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